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Summary  findings
In analyzing the transitional experience of countries in  were previously repressed; and the repressed sectors
Central and Eastern Europe(CEE) and the former Soviet  fueled the return to positive growth in fast reformers.
Union (FSU),  de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb find strong  For slow reformers, the main problem in achieving
common patterns for countries at similar stages of  stabilization has been the continued monetization of
reform despite differences in initial conditions. To  fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits, associated with attempts to
establish rankings, the authors  create a reform index  maintain employment in the old system.
combining the intensity and duration  of economic  Among the policy implications:
liberalization.  *  Stabilization is a priority for the resumption of
Freeing domestic prices is one element of reform  growth, and this requires extensive liberalization.
captured by the index; it was needed to enable  *  Stabilization is made difficult by output contractions
governments to cut subsidies and restore macroeconomic  in the early stages of liberalization (they reduce tax
balance. Other dimensions of reform captured  by the  revenues and raise claims on fiscal resources to cushion
index are liberalization of external trade, including  the effects), by limited external financing, and by very
foreign currency convertibility, and facilitation of private  large depreciations of the real exchange rate.
sector entry through  privatization of state enterprises and  * Contrary to previous suggestions, there is no
improvements in the environment for private sector  evidence that a slower pace of reform strengthens the
development. Some countries moved faster on reform  fiscal position of slow reformers; their consolidated fiscal
than others, and one major reason appears to have been  and quasi-fiscal deficits are quite high.
the pace of political liberalization.
Liberalization has encouraged capital and labor to
reallocate from industry toward services, many of which
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I. INTRODUCTION
The transition from a planned economy to a market economy involves a complex process
of institutional, structural and behavioral change.  Formerly communist countries have moved
along this transition to varying degrees.2 This paper places these countries into a comparative
perspective.  It emphasizes the cornerstone  of the early  reforms-economic  liberalization,  for
which  an  index  is  developed-and  its  interaction  with  growth  and  inflation:  how  do  these
outcomes relate to progress with reform?  It also considers macroeconomic and sectoral patterns
underlying these interactions.
The findings here help to explain two paradoxes of transition.  One is that the attempt
to maintain employment and output by fiscal and quasi-fiscal transfers to enterprises results in
larger output declines than a policy of hard budget constraints introduced along with economic
liberalization.  The  other  is  that  the  liberalization  of  prices  results  in  lower  inflation than
continued price controls.  In both cases,  liberalization leads to stabilization in a way that is not
self-evident to policy-makers accustomed to socialist pricing and output conventions.
The core countries analyzed are 26 in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Former
Soviet Union (FSU), plus Mongolia (which, as the so called "  16th Republic, " is included in the
FSU group).  China and Vietnam  are also  included for comparative purposes,  although these
countries are distinctive  in many respects. 3 The period covered  is  1989 through  1994.  The
starting point  is the last  year before  the initial postcommunist  transitions,  although Poland,
Hungary, the former Yugoslavia and China had previously initiated significant reforrns and other
countries had also taken some reform steps.
What are  the essential  commonalities at the  macroeconomic and  broad  sector level?
Section II highlights  four stylized  features of the socialist legacy  and predicts corresponding
outcomes from  transition. 4 Such changes  are stimulated by a wide  range of policy  reforms
'  Stoyan Tenev developed the switching regression technique used in this paper.  We appreciate comments on the economic
liberalization index by World Bank staff, and comments on other aspects of the paper by Lescek Balcerowitz,  Stanley Fischer,
Wafik Grais,  Arvo Kuddo,  Costas Michalopoulos, Branko Milanovic,  Randi Ryterman, Tevfik Yaprak,  and participants in the
First Dubrovnik Conference  on Transitional Economies,  where the paper was presented in June  1995.
2  See Fischer and Gelb 1991 for an early discussion of the elements of the transition processand Kornai 1993afor  a discussion
of the multi-faceted problems associated with the "transformational recession."
3  Transition countries in South Asia,  Africa,  and Latin America are not addressed  here,  nor are the  former  GDR, rump
Yugoslavia and Bosnia.
4  An important feature not mentioned is the widespread availability of basic human needs  (education, health services and
housing), associated with a more equal distribution of income than in capitalist countries (Milanovic 1995).  The transition has
been accompanied by increasing inequalities in money income and a deterioration in social services, but these issues go beyond
the scope of this paper.2
collectively  referred to as "economic  liberalization;"  but a summary  measure is needed  to link
liberalization  to macroeconomic  performance. In Section  III, we define  a composite  index  which
takes into account  three dimensions  of liberalization:  (i) internal  markets, (ii) external  trade, and
(iii) facilitation of private sector entry.'  Countries are ranked on the depth of these policy
reforms in each of six years of transition, 1989-94.  Country classification  is then based on
cumulative  liberalization-reflecting  duration as well  as depth of reform-because structural  and
institutional  adjustment  takes time, even when  policy  change itself  is rapid.  Countries  are placed
in four reform groups, plus a "war" category for those whose economies  have been severally
affected by conflict.
Section IV analyses cross-country  evidence on the interactions  between liberalization,
economic  growth (or contraction)  and inflation. Section  V extends this by looking at the time
profile of the transition  experience. It first traces the experience  of each reform group over the
period. It then  estimates  a regime-switching  equation  to provide  a profile for reformers  and non-
reformers.  Section VI considers macroeconomic  and sectoral patterns underlying the (rather
strong) relationships  derived above.
Section  VII addresses  the deeper question: "what  accounts  for economic  liberalization?"
Many characteristics, including history and culture affect policy choice, but here we look at
politics. For ECE and FSU, a close relationship  is found between economic  liberalization  and
political reform, as given by a widely used index of political freedom, and this is assessed.
Section  VIII summarizes  main conclusions  and their implications  for some policy debates.
Data Limitations
Before proceeding  with any empirical  paper on transition, one should  note very serious
data weaknesses. 6 Under socialism, output of state enterprises was often exaggerated,  while
during the  transition, output-and  especially the  size of  the  private  sector-tends  to  be
underreported, sometimes by large margins according to recent studies. 7 Stockbuilding  is
frequently  mismeasured. Inflation  is also difficult  to measure, with sharp changes  in the quality
and composition  of goods and a base period characterized  by serious shortages at fixed official
prices. Problems estimating deflators means that  "real" wages are  then hard to  measure.
Detailed  reviews of individual  countries  suggest  that official  unemployment  rates, which  range
from almost zero to  17 percent, reflect incentives to report as well as the actual level of
unemployment.  Trade and balance of payments data are difficult  to interpret consistently  over
time in the transition  from the planned  trading system  because of inconsistent  bilateral  exchange
5  EBRD  1994 provides  a  good  overview  of  many  dimensions of  policy  change  and  serves  as  a  1994 marker  for  the
liberalization index developed here.
6  For more discussion,  see EBRD 1994 and Balcerowitz and Gelb  1994 and references therein.
7  A separate problem is whether output is a useful welfare measure, since a proportion of its fall will involve the elimination
of production that has little value in a market economy driven by consumer preference.3
rates used in CMEA trade and problematic intra-USSR  trade data.  Cross-border trade is now
hard to monitor.
We have some  idea of the likely direction of most statistical  biases, but their extent may
differ among  countries. Balcerowicz  and Gelb 1994  argue, for example, that underreporting  of
output is likely to be larger in radical reformers, where private activity is growing fastest.
While this is not implausible, black markets thrive on pervasive regulation, and statistical
systems  have themselves  adjusted  less in certain slow-reforming  countries (and also in war-tom
countries), so that the opposite result could hold.8 We test the robustness  of the results of the
switching-regime  equation  in Section  VI by simulating  plausible  adjustments  for the underground
economy. But given the more general uncertainties,  the paper emphasizes  broad trends and large
observed differences, rather than fine ones.
II. THE  COMMON  LEGACY  AND ITS  IMPLICATIONS
The extent  to  which  transition  can be  considered  a common process  depends  on the
relative strength of  the  common legacy of  communism versus country-specific factors.
Transition  countries differed substantially  in their initial conditions,  which include the level of
income and wealth, the nature and extent of economic  distortions, and the level of institutional
development. 9 However, they also had a strong common  legacy that can be characterized  by
four features:
* Macrobalance  by direct control.  Financial  flows were the passive outcome  of central
directives  that regulated  credit and incomes. Financing  of enterprises  was set by a credit
plan, taking into account investment  targets, and implemented  through the mono-bank
financial  sector.  Surpluses  were accumulated  in large enterprises and were transferred
to the budget to finance subsidies and transfers as well as direct expenditures, which
accounted for up to 50 to 60 percent of GDP.  Given fixed prices and consumption
targets, wage  control was the critical factor for the balance  between output and demand.
In the years prior to the collapse  of the old regime, wage increases  exceeded  the ability
of the economy to provide consumer goods, resulting in involuntary accumulation  of
financial  assets, or repressed inflation.
* Coordination  through plans.  Economic activity was based on a central plan with
quantitative  output targets specified in physical units.  Heavy industry was accorded
priority over consumer goods, and service sectors were accorded low priority in the
Estimates  of unrecorded  economic  activity  exist  for a number  of countries  but vary widely  both between  countries  and, for
individual  countries,  between sources. The difficulty  in incorporating  such estimates into  growth rates is compounded  by the
lack of precise estimates  of the size  of unrecorded  economies  before  transition.
9 See de Melo, Denizer, Gelb, and Tenev (1995, forthcoming)  for an exploration  of the nature and importance  of initial
conditions  and other country-specific  factors in the transition  experience.4
allocation of resources.  The matching of income and expenditures with physical targets
was achieved through  coordinated,  economy-wide plans,  such as the central plan for
material  products,  the  manpower  plan,  the  credit  plan,  and  the  investment  plan.
Domestic trade was carried out by centralized organizations, and the CMEA (Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance) system linked most CEE countries and Mongolia into the
highly planned  economy  of  the  USSR.  These  practices  were  softened  in  "market
socialist"  countries,  but  even  there  discretionary  ex  post  interventions  by  central
authorities largely offset market forces.
* Little private ownership.  With limited exceptions, property rights were exercised by
the state, and private ownership was not allowed.  The lack of a profit motive, arising
from the absence of private ownership, adversely affected efficiency, and the prevalence
of planned allocations meant that communist economies had relatively few small firms.'"
* Distorted relative prices.  Prices played an accounting role and were set in accordance
with  the  central  plan.  Implicit  prices  of  essentials-including  housing,  energy,
transportation,  education  and  medical  care-were  kept  low,  and  land  prices  were
essentially zero."  Implicit trade margins were low, and prices of final goods failed to
reflect differences in distribution costs.
Table  1: From Plan to Market
What happens when a planned economy with the above features is replaced by a market
system with liberalized prices?" 2 Each of these features has its counterpart in systemic changes
occurring during transition (Table  1):
* Macroeconomic destabilization.  Initial price liberalization typically leads to subsequent
price increases, especially if it is undertaken under conditions of repressed inflation.  The
immediate challenge for macroeconomic policy is then to slow the rate of price increase
and reverse the inflationary expectations and flight from domestic financial assets that
follow  the  initial price  spike.  This  requires  introducing  hard  budget  constraints  on
enterprises while introducing well-targeted social expenditures,  including unemployment
benefits.  But inflationary pressures may persist, if and when the government's traditional
tax base  is eroded due  to:  output losses mentioned below,  further pressure  on state
enterprises'  revenues  due  to  their  loss  of  a  monopoly  position,  and  difficulties  in
imposing payments discipline through a previously passive financial system.
For a comparison of industrial organization, see Ryterman  1994.
Partly because of the suppression of prices in key nontraded sectors, the ratios of PPP-based GDP to exchange-rate based
GDP tend to be high for communist countries.  For discussion  of China (where the ratio has been up to 8 to  1) see Gelb,
Jefferson,  and Singh 1993 and World Bank 1994.
2  Elements of an  answer  to this question appear in various  works.  See Berg  and Sachs 1992, Berg  1993, Aghion and
Blanchard 1992, Coricelli  and Chadha  1993, Kornai 1993a, Ickes and Ryterman  1993, and Taylor  1994.5
a Output  declines from disruntions in the coordinating mechanism.  The sudden abolition
of  planning  in  a  complex,  highly  interdependent  economy  can  impair  economic
coordination,  affecting both useful and unwanted production pending the establishment
of  a  new,  efficient  system  of  market  coordination."  The  resulting  increases  in
transactions  costs  can  be  imagined as  a  negative  supply shock  to  an  economy-wide
production function which is specified to include coordination activities (such as trade
and payments) as an intermediate sector.  How serious output declines actually are would
depend on the degree of interdependence within the economy,  the extent to which the
planning  system  was  disrupted,  and  the  speed  at  which  the  new,  market-based
coordinating  system develops.  In some  countries,  where  plan coordination began to
deteriorate prior to price liberalization, costs may occur over many years.  For example,
in the FSU, the planning process deteriorated after glasnost and perestroika began to take
hold in 1987.
a Output gains from private ownership and private sector growth.  Efficiency gains come
from the legalization of private ownership, which creates incentives to maximize returns;
the establishment and enforcement of a legal framework to support private activities; and
the facilitation of private entry.  Much of the increased private sector output would be
produced by smaller  firms.  In the long run,  the movement from  (inefficient) plan to
(efficient) market should be equivalent to a positive supply shock, raising the efficiency
of resource allocation and creating a burst of economic growth, as well as increasing the
"utility" of output.  The latter would be expected to rise as output increasingly reflects
individual preference rather than the demands of a plan. 14
a Microeconomic and sectoral reallocations.  Microeconomic and sectoral reallocations
occur in response to price changes resulting from liberalization and cuts in subsidies, as
well as to changes in demand.  Previously repressed sectors, notably energy and services,
should expand and  offset  declines  in industry-especially  in  defence-related  industry,
given  substantial  cuts  in  defence  procurement-and  agriculture,  which  was  heavily
subsidized  in many countries.  Expansion  of previously repressed  nontraded  sectors,
including real estate, occur despite large devaluations in exchange rates, which normally
favor traded goods.  Developments in the labor market would reflect the changes in the
composition  of  sectoral  output,  and especially  the growth  of  small private  trade  and
transport activities.
'3  Consider, for example,  the case of the Kyrgyz Republic, which may have a comparative advantage in agriculture but has
no institutional mechanism to allocate and recover agricultural credit.  Other impediments to coordination have been introduced
as a result of new national boundaries,  which interfere with payments arrangements for the output from production monopolies
now located abroad,  or the allocation of previously centralized gas-pipeline capacity.
'4  If the post-transition distribution of income were very undesirable, the social utility of output could of course be judged as
inferior to an inefficient planned output bundle.6
These changes occur both as a result of disintegration of the old regime and in response
to active measures of economic liberalization.  An interesting question, that we address below,
is to what extent transition can be considered a common process, and in particular to what extent
differences in experiences with growth and inflation are associated with economic liberalization.
III.  COUNTRY  EXPERIENCE  WITH  ECONOMIC  LIBERALIZATION
In order to explore the broad cross-country relationships between growth,  inflation and
liberalization, we construct an annual index of liberalization for the transition period starting in
1989.  This  index  is  then  used  to  classify  countries  into  reform  groups,  based  on  their
cumulative experience with economic liberalization as of end-1994.  Comparative analysis shows
that recent experience with growth and inflation is broadly consistent within groups.
Aggregate  indicators
Growth, inflation, and liberalization are defined as follows:
Growth  is represented by annual changes in real, officially measured GDP.
Inflation  is represented by average annual changes in the CPI." 5
Liberalization  is  measured  by  an  index  of  economic  liberalization  that  has  been
constructed for purposes of the analysis below.  An annual Liberalization Index (LI) is calculated
for each  country  for  each  year  over  the  1989-94 period.  It  ranges  from  0 to  1,  where  0
represents  an  unreformed,  and  1 represents  a  basically-reformed,  country.  The  LI  is  the
weighted  average  (with  weights  of  0.3,  0.3.,  and  0.4  respectively)  of  0  to  1 rankings  of
liberalization in the following three areas:
I  - internal markets  (liberalization  of domestic  prices  and abolition  of state trading
monopolies);16
E - external markets (liberalization of the foreign trade regime,  including elimination
of export controls and taxes and substitution of low to moderate import duties for import
quotas and high import tariffs; currency convertibility);  and
'5  Substantial cross-country variation exists  in the behavior of different price indices.  In Poland and especially Bulgaria,
increases in the CPI have outpaced those in industrial prices,  reflecting a sharp rise in the relative price of services, which was
previously a suppressed sector.  In Russia, on the other hand, price liberalization was followed by a sharp increase in the relative
price  of  heavy  industrial  goods,  probably  reflecting  strong  monopoly  power  domestically  reinforced  by  limited  import
competition due to a very depressed  real exchange rate.
16  Countries with an I rating near unity may still maintain price controls on a range of non-traded household essentials,  in
particular rents and household utilities.7
P  - private sector entry  (privatization of  small-scale and  large-scale  enterprises  and
banking reform)." 1
The values assigned to these three areas in each year are shown for 28 transition economies in
the Appendix, which also explains how the values are derived.
The weights used in aggregating the components of the index are notional estimates of
the  relative  impact  of  I  and  E,  which  represent  liberalization  through  introduction  of
competitive,  flexible-price  markets,  and  P,  which  represents  liberalization  through  changing
ownership of fixed assets.  The effects of these components differ slightly, as mentioned below
in the discussion of the growth and inflation equations.
In  the  analysis  that  follows,  a  Cumulative  Liberalization  Index  (CLI)  is  defined  to
represent the duration as well as the intensity of reforms from 1989 onward.  It is calculated as
the sum of a  country's  LIs.  The rationale  for using the CLI  is that,  at any given moment,
economic performance  will not be  determined by the degree of liberalization  in that moment
alone;  it  will also  be  shaped  by  institutional and  other  changes  stimulated by  prior  policy
reforms.  CLIs for  1994 are shown in the Appendix and are used in Table 2 to rank CEE and
FSU countries not affected by war into four reform groups, determined by natural breaks in the
CLI values:
Group 1: advanced reformers (CLI  >  3)
Group 2:  (high) intermediate reformers (2  <  CLI  <  3)
Group 3:  (low) intermediate reformers (1.3  <  CLI  <  2)
Group 4: slow reformers (CLI  <  1.3)
Countries affected by war and the two East Asian countries are shown separately:
"War"  countries  include former Yugoslav and Soviet republics that have experienced
major and persistent  internal conflicts during  1989-94 or,  in the case of Armenia and
FYR Macedonia, conflict-related blockades.'8
The macro and reform experiences of the East Asia countries, China and Vietnam, differ
from those of CEE and the FSU.  Although their 1993/94 LIs are lower than those of
'  The indicators used for P are proxies for opening up the economy to private sector development.  They do not capture the
overall quality  of  the legal  and  regulatory  framework  or  the  effectiveness of government  in institution-building or  in the
implementation of reforms, but only because of the difficulty of developing comparative measures.  Also,  land privatization is
not included; however, several countries (Romania, Armenia,  Albania, and Lithuania) have privatized agricultural land, helping
to stimulate agricultural growth.
IB  Georgia and Armenia were relatively advanced among FSU reformers,  but have since used state controls to try to support
their "war economies".  For example, Armenia maintained state orders to ensure a supply of goods to barter with Turkmenistan
for vital energy supplies.  In regressions below, Moldova is included with the "war"  countries for  1992.8
advanced reformers like Poland, their CLIs are quite high, reflecting their introduction
of important reformns  before many of the other countries covered here.
Before  turning  to  an  analysis  of  the  interactions  between  growth,  inflation  and
liberalization,  we look more  closely at the properties  of the liberalization  index.  Figure  la
shows the evolution of means over the 1989-94 period,  and Figure  lb  shows the evolution of
standard deviations.  The means for I and E show large increases in 1991, reflecting reform in
CEE countries, and in 1992, reflecting reform in FSU countries;  the mean for P shows a more
modest but  steady increase  over  the whole period.  Comparing  means in  1989 with  those in
1994, the most progress has been in the liberalization of internal markets and the least in private
sector entry.  Standard deviations for I and E peaked in 1991 and have since declined, especially
for I, reflecting the fact that most countries had moved ahead on internal price liberalization by
1994,  even  though  no  country  had  fully  liberalized  prices.  The  standard  deviation  for  P
increases over time as privatization in some countries leaps ahead but lags in others.
Figures  la and  lb:  Means and Standard Deviations of LI Components
The three components  of the liberalization index are also  highly correlated  with each
other, suggesting that there is a high degree of complementarity in designing and implementing
different  types  of  refonn  and  that  any  one  component  will  perform  almost  equally well  in
regressions  against  growth  and  inflation.  The correlation-as  measured  by  the Pearson,  or
simple, correlation coefficient and the Spearman rank correlation coefficient-is  somewhat higher
between I and E than between either of these and P.  Pearson correlations are .93 (I and E),  .84
(I and P),  and .82 (E and P);  Spearman rank correlations are slightly higher.  As shown in the
following matrix  of  (Pearson)  correlation  coefficients,  the CLI  is marginally  more  strongly
associated with growth and inflation than the cumulative index of any one component  (shown
under I,  E and P):
Matrix of Simple Correlation Coefficients' 9
I  E  P  CLI
AVGR  .57  .52  .60  .59
AVLIN  -.72  -.67  -.73  -.74
GR93/4  .72  .69  .67  .73
LIN93/4  -.80  -.75  -.79  -.81
19  AVGR is average real GDP growth and AVLIN is the average log of inflation over 1989-94; GR93/4 and LIN93/4 are the
same variables for the period  1993-94.9
The CLI is constructed  to reflect the six year period  1989-94, where  the first year has
historical  significance  for  all  CEE  and  FSU  countries.  A  limitation on  the time  period  is
consistent with partial adjustment models, which show that the effect of reforms diminishes over
long periods.
IV.  GROWTH, INFLATION AND LIBERALIZATION
Following the dissolution of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and
the ruble zone,  each country  in the CEE and FSU has followed its own path to reform,  with
varying speed and intensity.  Here,  however, we explore the hypothesis that despite the diversity
in country circumstances,  simple relationships  exist between real GDP  growth and economic
liberalization; inflation and economic liberalization; and growth and stabilization.  The statistical
analysis below  suggests that variations  in country experience during  the transition  are in fact
strongly associated with liberalization and that the return to positive growth is associated with
declines in inflation to double digits or less.
Growth and liberalization
The data in Table 2 on growth and cumulative output declines show systematic variation
by  reform group  (based on  unweighted averages).  Although outputs  initially fell,  advanced
reformers were stable or growing in 1993/94; maximum output declines were about 80 percent
of those in 1989.  High intermediate reformers  lost about a third of their GDP, but most have
also stabilized or returned to positive growth.  The highest growth was in Albania, which has
benefitted from high external financing, and together with Romania, strong agricultural growth.
Low intermediate reformers have fared the worst so far,  with continuing strong output declines
through  1994.  The slowest reformers have managed to somewhat retard their output declines,
and Uzbekistan appears to have so far defied the general pattern by avoiding a major decline.
For the "war" countries,  huge cumulative output declines (which,  as shown below, have quite
distinctive sectoral features) highlight the cost of war and associated economic blockades.  At
the  other  end  of  the  spectrum,  the  East  Asian  experience  has  been  one  of  continuous
development; both China and Vietnam have experienced high growth since 1989.
Table 2: Liberalization.  Growth and Inflation
The overall relationship between recent output growth and the CLI  is shown in Figure
2 for the 20 CEE/FSU  countries not affected by war.  A simple quadratic relationship shows a
positive association between growth  in  1993/94 and the CLI.  It suggests that  over half the
variation in real  growth  is associated with  increases  in economic liberalization,  with growth
turning positive when the CLI reaches 3 or more.  An analysis of the separate effects of the I/E
and P components shows that although both show positive relationships similar to the one with
the CLI,  there  is a slightly stronger association of growth with the cumulative I/E  component
alone than with the full CLI,  and a weaker relationship with P.10
Figure 2: Growth and Liberalization
The CLI  in this  equation  as well as the one for  inflation results  in a higher R2 than
similar equations where the independent variable is the annual LI for 1994 or the average annual
Lls  for  1993/94.  This  suggests  that  the  duration,  as  well  as  the  intensity,  of  reforms  is
important.  Furthermore,  substituting  a  CLI  with  graduated  annual  weights  (giving  greater
weight to more recent years) for a CLI with equal annual weights results in a higher or equally
high  R2,  suggesting  that  use  of  a  limited  six-year  period  is  reasonable  even  though  some
countries (Yugoslavia,  Hungary,  Poland)  had a prior  history of significant reform  during the
1980s.
A multiple regression for average growth over the full six year period,  1989-94, for all
26 CEE/FSU  countries,  provides some additional insight into the relationship between growth
and  liberalization.  Per capita income in  1989 (PCY) is introduced to  allow for  the negative
effects of more pervasive central planning and overindustrialization in the more highly developed
CEE and FSU countries.  As discussed earlier, output declines resulted from disruption in these
centralized coordinating mechanisms.
AVGR  =  -9.1  +  2.6 CLI - .54 PCY  - 6.5 WAR  Adj R2  =  .65
(5.4)  (4.7)  (1.9)  (4.8)
The WAR dummy shows that war is associated with average declines of an extra 6.5 percentage
points.  A linear  relationship to  the CLI  fits better  than a quadratic one,  suggesting that the
positive impact on growth of economic liberalization is equally strong  in the upper  ranges of
growth, rather than declining as suggested by the quadratic relationship.  To summarize:
a Cumulative  liberalization  has a positive effect on output changes in CEE/FSU,
within  the overall context  of a "transitional  recession."
The distinctive response patterns of China and Vietnam relative to those of CEE/FSU
appear to be explained by several factors.  Perhaps most important is these countries'  large rural
economy  where decentralized incentives  led to a big output boost from new firms and family
farms.  In China, an economy  less centrally  planned than the FSU and low integration  into the
CMEA trade bloc, hence insulation from the shock of dissolution, were additional factors. 20
Inflation  and liberalization
Recent inflation shows systematic variation by reform group in Table 2,  and further
evidence  of a strong  relationship  between  inflation  and cumulative  liberalization  over the full six-
year period is provided in Table  3.  This evidence  shows  that advanced  reformers  were relatively
20  See, for example,  Sachs and Woo 1994 and Thuyet 1995.11
successful  in  containing  the  inflationary  bursts  that  followed  price  liberalization,  while
intermediate performers have endured longer and more severe bouts of inflation.  The continuing
high levels of inflation in the slow reformers suggest that they have delayed, rather than avoided,
adjustment.
Table 3: Inflation Experience by Reform Group.  1989-94
Inflation seems to decline more slowly in the FSU in response to stabilization measures.
In the non-Baltic FSU,  for example, a widening of industrial price-cost margins is believed to
reflect monopolistic pricing during the initial inflationary surge (Balcerowitz and Gelb  1994).
However,  the record  of the Baltics,  as well as of more recent  stabilizers such as the Kyrgyz
Republic and Moldova,  suggests that, with determined policies, inflation can be brought down
to moderate levels as quickly as in CEE.
Regression  analysis  indicates  a  strong  negative  association  between  inflation  and
economic liberalization.  The  R2  of  a  simple log  linear  relationship  for  the  20  CEE/FSU
countries  not  affected  by  war  is  over  80 percent,  suggesting  a  close  relationship  between
economic liberalization and  1993/94 average inflation (Figure  3).  An analysis of the separate
effects of the I/E  and P components shows that both have a strong relationship with inflation,
although neither has as strong a relationship as does the CLI; the I/E component again shows
a stronger association than the P component.
Figure 3: Inflation and Liberalization
A multiple regression  for  all 26  CEE/FSU  countries shows  that cumulative economic
liberalization,  output  decline,  repressed  inflation,  and  war  are  all  associated  with  average
inflation.  Output decline is included to capture the fact that a fall in the transactions demand
for  money  will-other  things  being  equal-result  in  higher  inflation.  The  relationship  is
estimated over the most recent four years only to avoid the effects of inherited inflation:
AVLIN1/4  =  3.4 - .88 LCLI  +  .64 LDROP  +  .036 RINFL  +  1.2 WAR
(2.4)  (2.3)  (1.5)  (2.1)  (2.8)
Adj. R2  =  .76
where LDROP represents the log of the maximum drop in the annual index of real GDP for each
country (1989 =  100); RINFL represents repressed inflation defined as the increase in deflated
wages less the change in real GDP during 1987-89; and WAR is a dumnmy  variable for countries
affected by war.  In general:
* CEE and FSU countries that failed to liberalize experienced  far higher inflation
over the 1991-94  period.12
By contrast,  China and Vietnam  experienced relatively  stable prices over  this period,
even though the extent of liberalization was less than in the CEE and FSU advanced reformners.
The policy of gradual liberalization over a number of years-since  1978 for China and since the
mid-1980s for Vietnam-has  created a  less disruptive environment, as has the lack of serious
regional conflict.  Moreover,  the  absence of initial monetary overhang and subsequent output
drops allowed prices to be liberalized without provoking a sudden major burst of inflation and
the associated flight from domestic currency.
Growth and stabilization
In market economies,  it is usually assumed that stabilization carries  a cost in terrns of
growth.  But it is clear from  cross-country  data  in Table 2 that output recovery  in transition
economies  is associated  with  declining inflation.  A  two-way causality between growth  and
stabilization is likely  to  exist,  as  recovery  will  have a favorable  impact on budget deficits,
reducing  inflationary  pressures.  Figure  4  plots  changes  in  output  against  experience  with
stabilization, where the latter is defined as the year of highest inflation and all subsequent years.
Inflation is measured as the annual average and is introduced with a one year lag.  The statistical
relationship suggests that a return to positive growth requires inflation to drop below 100 percent
a year.
Figure 4:  Growth and Stabilization
The numbers on the graph refer to a country's  CLI at the time of the observation.  They
confirm a strong relationship between liberalization and stabilization which is consistent with the
above discussion of liberalization and  inflation.  The most important outliers,  notably Albania
and Turkmenistan,  benefit  from  growth  led by primary  sectors,  agriculture  and  natural  gas
respectively.  An important policy implication is:
a  Output recovery  in CEE  and FSU  countries requires  stabilization of prices to
moderate levels.
A related issue is the perceived output cost of stabilization.  Because transition economies
initiated the reform process under  negative growth conditions and all registered  large declines
of  output,  some  policy-makers  argued  during  transition  that  stabilization  would  involve
substantial output costs and adjustment should be gradual. 2"  On the other hand, some analysts,
noting that output falls coincided with tight stabilization programs  in CEE,  argued that such
programs exacerbated output contraction.
21  Most FSU leaders subscribed to this point of view.  See Fedorov (1995) in the case of Russia and World Bank (1993) for
Uzbekistan.
22  See Portes (1993) who argued this point of view.13
There are two factors which have made these concerns unwarranted.  First,  declines in
the early stages of transition were  largely attributable to permanent relative price changes and
structural demand shifts, which turned a substantial portion of previous production into negative
value-added.  This necessitated a change in output composition, which is shown below to occur
at a rapid rate in high CLI countries.  As we show in the paper, this was accompanied at the
same time by stabilization and lower output drops in high CLI countries;  lower because output
drops  in  this  group  were  moderated  by  the  rapid  growth  of  previously  repressed  sectors.
Second, the fall in output was greater in the FSU countries where stabilization was not attempted
until recently.  Taken as a whole, these factors suggest that the output cost of stabilization has
not  been  large. 23 In  fact,  since  stabilization  preceded  growth  in  CEE,  it  seems  that  the
opportunity cost of not stabilizing would have been potential growth, which in turn suggests the
cost of not stabilizing is actually higher than the cost of doing so.
Neither the CEE and FSU countries affected by war nor China and Vietnam are included
in this analysis.  Most of the former were still suffering from high inflation in 1994-although
Croatia and the FYR Macedonia had recently introduced stabilization programs-and  the latter
were  growing strongly throughout the  1989-94 period  in an environment  of low to  moderate
inflation.
V. THE TIME PROFILE OF GROWTH AND INFLATION
Here,  we investigate whether there are common patterns in the time profile of country
experience which go beyond the broad relationships proposed above.  We do this in two ways.
The  first  way  is  to  estimate  "regime-switching"  equations  to  provide  stylized  profiles  of
reformers  and  non-reforners.  The  second way  is to  trace  the experience  with growth  and
inflation of  the four  reform  groups  identified earlier.  In both  cases,  we are  looking at the
interaction of growth and inflation over time.  We exclude the East Asia experience as patterns
differ there. 24
Under the first approach,  we estimate "regime-switching" equations across all 26 CEE
and  FSU countries.  However,  to  do this,  we  need to  define the year  in  which the regime
changes.  This is easy for countries such as Poland that made a decisive change in a given year.
It  is harder  for  countries  where  reform  has  been more  gradual  or  more partial.  To  avoid
arbitrary specification of the switch points,  we set the regime change on the basis of the CLI.
23  In his analysis of 28 high inflation episodes,  Easterly (1995) also  found that inflation stabilization was expansionary on
average.  Sargent (1992) in his analysis of hyperinflation in Austria, Germany, Hungary and Poland also argued that output costs
of stabilization programs in those countries were small.
24  When China  and Vietnam are  included in the  regression analysis,  for  example,  the signs  and values of  the  equation
coefficients are similar, but the overall explanatory value is slightly less; their experience does not fit the profile of the other
countries.14
First, the CLIs were rescaled so that Poland would have 5 years of reform by end-1994,
implying  that the new regime started in January 1990 (5 years earlier), as was the case.  As all
CLIs  are  normalized by  the  same factor (1.2),  the  implication is  that countries'  reform
experience is being judged in "Poland-equivalent-reform"  years.CL.1 25
Once rescaled, the new CLI is rounded  off to the nearest year.  Working  backward  from
end-1994, each country has at least one observation  in the reform regime and one in the non-
reform  regime. For example, Poland  has one observation  (1989)  in the non-reform  regime and
5 observations  (1990-94) in the reform regime.  Turkmenistan, with the lowest CLI, has 5
observations  (1989-1993)  in the non-reform regime and one (1994) in the reform regime.
The equation  specifying the time profiles of growth (GR) and inflation (INFL) relative
to reform is as follows:
R-1  94




i  are dummy variables  for the successive  years before reform  begins for each country,
starting in 1989;
DA
i  are dummy variables for successive  years after reform begins;
WAR is a dummy variable set equal to one for each year when war or  associated
blockades seriously affect a given country; and
R is the year of reform.
Thus, dummy  variables are used to define the variation  in country experience  in relation  to the
timing  of reform and to capture the different  economic  experience  of countries affected  by war.
5 Two possible  alternatives  were considered:  (i) to set the switch  point according  to the announcement  of a comprehensive
reform program  (as in EBRD 1993), and (ii) to set the switch according  to the year of maximum  increase  in the LI.  These
procedures  are unsatisfactory  because  they fail to take into  account  the actual  degree  of reform. In any case, the general  pattern
of results is surprisingly  robust to a variety  of ways of deriving  the switch  point from the CLI index.15
Table 4 shows the estimated coefficients of these equations. 26 When added to the
intercept, they provide the growth and inflation  time profiles of a regime of non-reform (the b
coefficients) versus a  regime of  reform (the c coefficients).  Caught in the  deteriorating
environment  of a disintegrating  economic  system,  non-reformers  initially  succeed  in delaying  the
decline  in output.  Performance  then contracts at an accelerating  rate, so that after three years
their position has deteriorated  strongly  compared to the reformers. Cumulative  output declines
are far higher than in the reform regime, indicating that the status quo is not a viable option for
countries  experiencing  the disruptions  in internal and external  economic  coordination  discussed
in Section  II.  Although  theoretically  it might be possible  to follow a gradualist  reform program,
empirical  evidence suggests that gradualism  has not paid off.
Table 4: Switching  Regressions
The growth regression shown in Figure 5 has reasonably  good explanatory  power, for
an essentially cross-section relationship.  The time profile shows that reforming countries
experience  a sharp contraction  in the first year of reform but begin to recover after four years.
The dummy  variable coefficient  for countries  affected by war indicates a high and statistically
significant additional cost of conflict.  Each year of war reduces output by an additional 9
percentage  points.
Figure 5: Growth Profiles for Reform and Non-Reform
As indicated  in Section  I, there are various hypotheses  about the bias in underreporting
of output. To assess sensitivity,  we assume  that official GDP not only understates  real GDP in
transition  countries  but that it understates  the unofficial  economy  more in countries  experiencing
the largest declines because these countries have the weakest statistical systems.27  We have
therefore  undertaken  a simulation  exercise  to test the robustness  of the growth  profiles  discussed
above. All countries  are assumed  to have a GDP adjustment  coefficient  of 1.15 with respect to
their official  economy  in 1989, and this coefficient  in subsequent  years increases  proportionally
more in economies  with the largest  output drops. The resulting  GDP adjustment  coefficients  for
underground  economies  range from 0.2 for Hungary to 0.5 for Georgia. 28 The results of the
switching  regression are quite similar for the adjusted data.
2'  We have attempted  to assess the stability  of coefficients  between  the earlier and later reformers.  Preliminary  results do
not usually reject the hypothesis  of stable coefficients,  but such tests are problematic  with limited observations,  especially
because,  given  the period  covered, early reformers  do not have many pre-reform  years as observations  and late reformers  have
few post-reform  years.
27  This adjustment  is the least favorable  to our hypothesis  as it supports  the view that the unrecorded  economy  is higher  in
countries  that have liberalized  less (and have  the largest  recorded  output  drops). On-going  research  by Daniel  Kaufman  of the
World  Bank  provides support  for the view that the informal  economy  is higher in countries  that have liberalized  politically  but
not economically;  the adjustment  here has the same feature.
2I  The  formula  for calculating  the adjustment  coefficient  for 1994  is: 1.2 + (1.5 - 1.2)  * [(country  i's drop in GDP  since 1989)
-(the  minimum  drop in GDP in sample)]/[(maximum  drop in GDP in sample)  -(minimum  drop in GDP in sample)].  Adjustment
coefficients  for intervening  years are derived  by interpolation.16
The implied inflation rates for reform and non-reform prototypes  are shown in Figure
6.  The stage of liberalization  is a surprisingly strong predictor of inflation.  As expected,
liberalization  is associated with a sharp price spike in the first year.  In subsequent years,
inflation  is usually  brought down, typically  to about 20 percent after four years.  Slow  reformers
initially  manage  to sustain inflation  rates at moderate levels. After three years, however, their
inflation rates soar far above the peak levels in the reforming countries as their economies
contract sharply.  As might be expected from the severity of their output losses, inflation is
significantly  higher in war countries  than would  otherwise  be expected,  given their liberalization
profiles.
Figure 6: Inflation Profiles for Reform and Non-Reform
Under the second approach to exploring the time profile of transition, we analyze the
experience  of the 20 CEE and FSU countries  in the four reform groups  identified  earlier and use
regression  analysis to trace the average experience of each of these groups, as it starts reform,
over the reform period.  Using the normalized  CLI, representing Poland-equivalent  reform
years, advanced reformers are assumed to start reforms in 1990, high intermediate  reformers
in 1991, low intermediate  reformers in 1992, and slow reformers in 1993.  The main finding
is that each reform group follows a similar pattern.  Figure 7 shows that advanced  reformers
effectively initiated reform in  1990 and growth turned positive after three Poland-reform-
equivalent  years.  Output declines  for other groups accelerate  as each begins reform, and these
declines  were increasingly  prolonged  and/or severe for the slower reformers. By 1994, only the
advanced  and high intermediate  reformers had returned to positive growth, on average.  Low
intermediate  and slow reformers continued  to experience major output declines.
Fizure 7: Paths of Growth by Reform Group
A clear pattern can also be seen for inflation. In all groups, initial price liberalization
led to a jump in inflation  in the year of reform (Figure 8).  In advanced  reformers, inflation  rose
quickly  and then declined;  elsewhere, it rose after some  delay but remains  high.  Some  regional
variation  in inflation  experience is evident. The highest inflation  has occurred  in the non-Baltic
FSU, where participation in the ruble zone has resulted in imported Russian inflation.  But
experience in Eastern Europe suggests  that even had the other former Soviet republics  rapidly
introduced  their own currencies,  many would  not have been  able to maintain  price stability  given
the slowness of their liberalization  programs.  Indeed, the introduction  of new currencies in
former Soviet states has frequently  been marked by very high inflation.
Figure 8: Inflation  by Reform Group17
VI. UNDERLYING  MACROECONOMIC  AND SECTORAL  PATTERNS
Patterns  underlying  growth
Why do growth  rates seem  to rise after a period of liberalization  and stabilization? There
are several possible explanations: (i) an increased flow of external finance; (ii) a recovery in
investment  levels; (iii) increases in employment;  and (iv) an accelerated  process of economic
restructuring. We examine  them in turn. Structural change appears to be the main factor.
(i) External  finance.  The role of external resources  in the transition process has been
debated  (IMF 1994, EBRD 1994, Sachs 1994, Dabrowski 1995). On the one hand, Dabrowski
has argued that too much finance too early can weaken pressures for reform.  On the other,
external finance can  encourage adjustment by  providing investment resources and  non-
inflationary  financing of temporary fiscal deficits.  The availability  of foreign finance also
depends  on the reforms themselves,  so that two-way  causality is expected.
Table 5 shows the current account balance of payments as  a percentage of GDP in
1989-94 and in 1994.  On (unweighted)  average, current deficits have been modest over the
period in groups 1 and 4, larger in the intermediate  groups 2 and 3, and in the war countries,
especially those in the FSU.  The picture in  1994 points to larger deficits among the least
reformed  countries.
Table  5: Net Exteral  Financing  and Fixed Investment
Current accounts have varied a great deal between countries however, for a variety of
reasons. For example, Turkmenistan's 1994  deficit reflects repayment  of previous involuntary
export credits to natural gas importers, while that of the Kyrgyz Republic shows its ability to
attract external assistance as the most advanced  reformer in Central Asia.  Mongolia, Albania
and Moldova  have also benefitted  from high external assistance. 29 In general:
* Net external finance has little systematic relationship with the extent of reforn  or
growth  performance.
(ii) Investment. 30 According to official data, fixed investment continues at moderate
levels, and varies only slightly, relative to GDP, across the four reform groups (Table 5).
Private investment and  GDP  are,  of  course,  inadequately  captured.  Only Ukraine and
Turkmenistan  are reported as suffering  a complete  investment  collapse.
29 Between  1991  and 1994,  some  Central Asian republics  received  large export  credits  from Turkey  while Ukraine,  Belarus,
Armenia  and several Central  Asian republics  received  monetary  transfers  and "technical  credits"  from Russia  to cushion  terms
of trade  shocks from the liberalization  of energy prices.
3  The focus here is on fixed investment, since estimates of total investment  are particularly unreliable for transition
economies;  changes  in stocks are estimated  for some  countries  to be plus or minus 20 percent  or more of GDP.18
Fixed  investment was high  in most of the countries prior  to  reform,  ranging from  21
percent of GDP in Hungary to 44 percent in Mongolia (which received transfers from the USSR
equivalent to  30 percent  of GDP).  Levels were  higher in  the Soviet Union than in  Eastern
Europe however,  so that the decline between  1989 and  1994 was only 4  percent  of GDP in
group  1, compared with  14 percent  and  12 percent  in groups 2 and 3 respectively.  While the
more buoyant economies of group 1 may have sustained investment spending, the larger declines
in the  less advanced  reformers  mainly  reflects  their  higher-and  more  wasteful-pre-reform
levels.  In general:
* Fixed investment rates differ only slightly among reform groups. Investment is at
moderate  levels for many transition  countries,  but far below previous  highs.
(iii) Employment.  It is very difficult to obtain a reliable time series of employment in
transition countries; but initial levels of labor force participation in transition countries were very
high.  Statistics on unemployment do exist, however, and Table 6 shows the association between
registered  unemployment  levels in  1994 and the CLI.  Unemployment is a  noisy transition
indicator,  and  there  is  considerable  cross-country  variation  in  the  incentives  to  report.
Registered unemployment varies greatly from any pattern that might be expected from recorded
declines in output-indeed,  it tends to be higher in the countries where output has recovered the
most.
Table 6:  Registered Unemployment through Transition
This may  reflect the success of these countries  in downsizing  or closing loss-making
firms, and freeing up resources for new activities.  It may also reflect a tendency for recorded
levels to be higher in Eastern Europe than in FSU countries comparably advanced in the reform
process.  For example, a considerable proportion of the unemployed recorded in Hungary are
believed to  have  been working,  and  Vodopivec  (1994) finds  evidence  in  Slovenia  that the
duration of registered unemployment  is closely associated with  the duration  of benefits,  with
many people "finding work" in the last months of eligibility.  In contrast, limited unemployment
benefits in Armenia and the stigma associated with  being unemployed result in low recorded
unemployment even though energy shortages have heavily constrained industrial activity.
Unemployment estimates must be interpreted with caution, but the negative relationship
with growth is striking, particularly since higher unemployment in market economies is typically
associated with lower labor force participation because of the "discouraged worker"  effect.  In
general:
* The negative association  between  registered  unemployment  and growth make it
unlikely  that large increases  in employment  underlie output recovery.
(iv) Structural change.  Table 7a shows the shifts of output in current prices between
broad production  sectors, and Table 7b shows  the corresponding  shifts in constant  prices.  The
more advanced reforners  have experienced an accelerated shift from industry, which was19
overbuilt, towards services, which  were repressed. This shift reflects higher  profitability  in the
growing sectors and leads to faster output recovery.  On average, the share of current price
services  in GDP has increased  by 15 percentage  points in the advanced  reformers, 10 percentage
points in the high intermediate reformers, and 7 percentage points in the low intermediate
reformers.3 '
Table 7a: Sectoral Shifts at Current Prices
Table 7b: Sectoral Shifts at Constant Prices
These structural  shifts have occurred despite  the fact that services fell, relative to GDP,
in almost all FSU countries  between 1990  and 1992, due to a precipitous  decline in government
(including  military)  services. Growth  in services  has been concentrated  in private trade, finance
and other business and consumer services. These activities  represent a major locus for private
wealth accumulation,  which-in some countries-is now starting to be used to acquire industrial
assets. 32 Service growth is undoubtedly  severely understated  because of the underreporting  of
private activity, but its growth may also be exaggerated  by the fact that many services were
previously  incorporated  into industrial  firms and not separately  distinguished.
In the more advanced reformers, the fall in industrys share has been across-the-board,
including military production, heavy industry  and consumer manufactures  uncompetitive  with
imports.  A striking  development  has been the sharp deconcentration  of industrial  employment
by firm size (see, for example, Komai 1994  and Balcerowitz  and Gelb 1994). This has resulted
from a combination  of new private entry, layoffs  from the state sector, and the breakup  of large
state firms, sometimes  in the course of spontaneous  processes separating  good and bad assets
prior to privatization. 33
According  to official statistics, the shift away from industry has not taken place in the
countries with low CLIs.  Indeed, industry's measured share has actually risen for some low
intermediate  and slow reformers. Service sectors are certainly  larger than estimated  officially,
as some services are included  in the unofficial  economy, but they are less well developed  than
in countries with high CLIs.  Also, where reforms are slow, service sector growth may not
signal private sector growth; government-owned  monopolies have been known to  absorb
previously autonomous firms (tourism in Uzbekistan) and to have created higher regulatory
barriers to entry.
3'  Not much  weight  can  be put on differences  between  current  and constant  price  data  for services;  even  for market  economies,
deflators  for many services  are problematic.
32  One  example  is the 1995  purchase  of Russian  energy  companies  by a consortium  of Russian  banks.
3  Such  processes  have been especially  powerful  in Hungary:  see Brada, Singh and Torok 1994.20
The relative  performance  of agriculture  varies considerably  among  countries. Pre-reform
agriculture was inefficiently  organized  but benefitted  from subsidies, including  through credit,
energy and other  inputs.  Performance during the  transition reflects a variety of effects,
including  privatization  in some countries, relative  price changes (which have especially  hit the
livestock sectors) and a critical emerging shortage of liquidity at farm level.  Widespread
drought in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s also complicates  the picture.  High intermediate
reformers  with a strong agricultural  response include Romania, Albania and Mongolia;  all are
leaders in agricultural privatization.  Among the slow reformers, Ukraine has experienced  a
substantial shift from industry to  agriculture, reflecting a  strong comparative advantage in
farming. Recorded output patterns for the "war" economies  are distinctive. Faced with over-
estimated,  but still very large, declines  in aggregate  activity,  populations  have retreated  towards
subsistence  farming. In general:
* Dramatic  changes  in the sectoral  composition  of GDP underlie  the recovery  in real
output.
Statistical  measures  of the transition  between "socialist"  (generally  public)  and "market"
(generally  private) sectors of the economy are not readily available  for all countries, but rough
measures  confirm a picture of higher private sector shares as liberalization  progresses.
Patterns  underlying  inflation
Why has  inflation come down in countries following a period of liberalization  but
remained  high for others? There are several  possible  explanations:  (i) exchange  rate movements;
(ii) conventional  budget deficits; (iii) quasi-fiscal deficits; and (iv) monetary developments.
These are examined  in turn.  The main spur to inflation  appears to have been from quasi-fiscal
deficits and the associated  monetary expansion.
(i) Exchange  rate  movements.  Figure 9 shows the ratio of the nominal exchange rate to
an estimated purchasing power parity (PPP) rate as an indicator of the real exchange rate.3
In both floating-rate  and pegged-rate  countries, large real exchange  rate depreciations  occurred
during the early stages of reform in conjunction  with price liberalization  and elimination  of the
money  overhang. These huge real devaluations  sustained  external  balance  but surely  exacerbated
inflationary  pressures  at the time. Subsequently,  however, exchange  rates strengthened  towards
a market rate of twice the PPP rate, a ratio consistent  with comparable  ratios for countries at
comparable  levels of PPP income (Balcerowitz  and Gelb 1994). In general:
* Large depreciations  of the real exchange rate occurred  during  the early stages of
liberalization,  but the ratio of real rates  to PPP  rates was subsequently  fairly steady.
Figure 9: Ratio of Market Exchange Rates to PPP Rates
'4  As pointed  out in Balcerowicz  and Gelb 1994,  exchange  rates  that prevailed  under  central  planning  cannot  be used to impute
equilibrium values.21
(ii) Conventional  budget  deficits. As Table 8 indicates, revenue shares in GDP averaged
50 percent for the advanced reformers  in 1994-some  4 percent lower than in 1989.35 At 33
percent of GDP on average, revenues in high intermediate reformers had stabilized in 1994 but
at far lower levels than before.  At 24 percent of GDP, revenue shares were lowest in the low
intermediate reformers.  In Mongolia and some former Soviet republics, revenue declines reflect
the elimination of previous large budgetary transfers from the center.
In the slow reformers, reported revenue shares have fallen only in Turkmenistan where
trading  partners  failed  to  pay  for  gas  exports.  However,  revenue  performance  is  partly
spurious-reflecting  payments to the budget taken out of credit subsidies from the Central Bank
(see below).  The surprisingly  strong performance  of  "war" countries was largely due to the
inclusion of foreign grants: in Georgia, revenues net of grants collapsed to 3 percent of GDP
in 1993.
Table 8: Revenue. Expenditure, and Fiscal Balance
Except in the advanced reformers,  expenditures typically fell less than revenues and in
some cases they increased substantially relative to GDP.  The largest increases in expenditure
shares were  in the  "war" countries,  although slow reformers  also showed some increases on
average.  In  advanced  reforners,  cuts  in  subsidies  ranged  from  7  to  10 percent  of  GDP,
although these were offset by rising social expenditures. 36
Fiscal  deficits  increased  on  average  for  all  CEE  and  FSU  groups  except  advanced
refonners  between 1989 and 1994.  Deficits averaged  2 percent of GDP in advanced reformers
and  7  percent  of  GDP  in  intermediate  reformers.  They  were  surprisingly  modest  in  slow
reformers still experiencing very high inflation. In general:
* Fiscal  revenues  and  expenditures  have  been  maintained  in  advanced  and slow
reformers but  have  fallen  dramatically  in  intermediate  reformers.  Open  fiscal
deficits  have  been moderate  in most  countries.
(iii)  Quasi-fiscal deficits.  Quasi-fiscal  expenditures  may  include  extra-budgetary
financing for debt write-offs,  implicit subsidies in connection with foreign exchange guarantee
schemes, and  implicit subsidies  resulting from  the provision  of  credit  to banks and  firms at
highly  negative real  interest  rates.  This  last category,  which  reflects  attempts to  maintain
production  and employment in  industry  and agriculture,  is shown in  Table 9  for a  range of
3  See EBRD (1994) and IMF (1994).  The common pattern was for revenues to decline during the first year of reforms but
to rebound starting in the second year.
36  This substitution was predicted by Bruno (1993) and pointed out by EBRD (1994) and Coricelli (1994).  In Hungary and
Poland, increases in social security expenditures have been particularly  large.  In 1993, social spending amounted to 18 percent
and 20 percent of GDP respectively.  Hungary and Poland have also experienced a steady rise in interest payments on debt, to
around 4 to 5 percent of GDP.  As a result, total expenditures reached close to 60 percent of GDP in Hungary and 50 percent
in Poland, higher than the European Union average.22
countries.  The  subsidies  shown  are  calculated  as  the difference  between  the  central  bank
discount rate and the inflation rate,  applied to gross monthly (or quarterly)  central bank credit
outstanding to the non-government  sector. 37 Estimates of the other quasi-fiscal expenditures
are more difficult to obtain on a comparable basis. 38
Table 9:  Fiscal Deficits and Quasi-Fiscal Expenditures
for Selected Countries.  1992-94
In countries where reforms lag and structural change has been resisted, the consolidated
deficits,  also  shown  in  Table  9,  are  much larger  than open  fiscal  deficits. 39 Central  bank
subsidies in the slow reforming countries have been on the order of three times the fiscal deficit,
and far exceed any plausible estimate of tax revenue recouped from subsidized firms.  Only in
more  advanced reformers,  where  stabilization  is more  or  less achieved and  rapid  structural
change is in process,  have these losses been eliminated. Declines in the consolidated deficits in
1994 for several slow reformers are encouraging in this respect.
m  Quasi-fiscal  losses have been the major inflationary  force in the slower reformers.
(iv) Monetary developments.  Table 10 shows real money growth,  real money balances,
and real interest rates across countries. 40 Nominal growth of broad money during  1992-94 has
been lowest in advanced reformers and highest in slow reformers,  and in countries affected by
war.4'  The  relatively  low money  growth  of  the  advanced  reformers  was  accompanied  by
policies allowing real interest rates to rise to either positive or slightly negative levels.  Only in
these countries have real money balances actually increased on average.
Table  10: Money.  Interest Rates and Real Balances
Broad money grew rapidly in intermediate and slow reformers while real interest rates
were  substantially negative.  Real  money  balances  fell  sharply  in  1992.  Thereafter,  they
"  Quasi-fiscal losses are computed  on average balances by month or quarter,  and are  divided by estimated  monthly (or
quarterly) GDP to obtain a percentage subsidy flow.  These are then averaged, to obtain the annual average.
3  Extra-budgetary debt write-offs have been estimated at an additional 3.4 percent of GDP in 1992 and 3.8 percent of GDP
in  1993 for  Bulgaria,  and such  write-offs  are known  to exist in other  countries,  such as  Hungary  and  Kazakhstan.  The
importance of such write-offs would be expected to mount after real interest rates are increased to positive levels.
3  For comparison, central bank subsidies to state enterprises in China have been substantial over the last 5 years,  but this has
not so far caused excessive inflation because of rapid growth in the demand for money.  See "China: State Finances" in Oxford
Analytica, March 9,  1995.  See also McKinnon (1993), Cardoso and Yusuf (1994).
4  For a discussion of conceptual issues and detailed reviews of monetary policy issues during transition see (Edwards 1992),
Bruno (1993), Bredenkamp (1993),  Sachs (1995), Sahay and Vegh (1995), Citrin, Anderson,  and Zettelmeyer (1995).
4'  For  transition economies,  Citrin, Anderson,  and Zettelmeyer (1995) support the view that  nominal money growth is the
best indicator of policy stance-better  than real money growth or real interest rates.  See de Grauwe (1995) for a more general
discussion of assessing the stance of monetary policy.23
stabilized in the high intermediate reformers but continued to decline in the slower reformers.
The real discount rate on central  bank credit  seems to have risen  in  1994, although there  is
substantial variation across the countries.
These patterns  reflect the strong causal links between structural reforms  and monetary
developments.  Restrictive  monetary  policies  in  advanced  reformers  not  only  allowed
stabilization; they facilitated currency convertibility and liberalization.  Liberalization,  in turn,
was needed to render effective the hard budget constraints that allow restrictive macro-policies
to be sustained.  Liberalization and stabilization, together,  have then impelled the reallocation
of real resources.  In intermediate and slow reformers, continued large subsidies to state-owned
agriculture  and  industry  have been financed  by  central  bank  resources,  but  loose monetary
policies did not prevent continued drops  in output through the end of  1994. Output recovery
appears to  be  related  to  the  improved allocation  of  available  resources  rather  than to  more
relaxed monetary policy.  In general:
Monetary and interest rate patterns are consistent with the progression of reforms.
VII. LIBERALIZATION AND POLITICAL FREEDOM
The above discussion highlights the central importance of liberalization in the transition
process, and we close by asking the question: "What determines the pace of liberalization?"  We
explore the hypothesis that economic liberalization is associated with political change. 42
Country  rankings  of the Cumulative Liberalization Index are shown in Table  11 along
with measures of political freedom provided in the Comparative Survey of Freedom for  1994
(Karatnycky 1995).  This survey has been published annually by Freedom House since 1973 and
is defined by traditional  political rights and civil  liberties of Western democracies.  The two
components of the index are highly correlated and in previous research gave very similar results
when used separately (Helliwell 1994).  Country  rankings, based primarily  on responses to a
checklist of  indicators,  reflect  the judgment  of  a project  team  that consults  a  vast  array  of
published materials as well as regional experts and human rights specialists.
The Survey is not a score card for governments,  but rather an assessment of the effect
on  personal  freedoms  caused  by  both  government  and  non-government  (e.g.,  military  or
religious groups) factors.  There is some evidence that the Survey findings are robust (Inkeles
1990).  Following a conference  in 1988 on measuring democracy,  Inkeles concludes that the
underlying  measures of political freedom  are common to all rating  systems,  even if specific
indicators vary,  and that there  is high agreement in the results of alternative classifications.
Table  11: Political Freedom and Degree of Liberalization
42  See de  Melo,  Denizer.  Gelb  and  Tenev  (1995,  forthcoming)  for  further  analysis  of  the  determinants  of  economic
liberalization.24
In Table 11, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient for all 26 CEE and FSU countries
is 0.8.4  Excluding  the  war  countries,  it  is  0.91-indicating  a  very  close  correspondence
indeed.  A non-linear  relationship fitted to  the data of all 26 CEE/FSU  countries,  excluding
China and Vietnam,  is shown in Figure  10.  It indicates accelerated economic liberalization at
higher levels of political freedom,  and in general supports the following proposition:
* Economic liberalization is typically associated with a similar  degree of  political
change.
Figure  10:
Political Freedom and Degree of Economic Liberalization
One explanation  for this  high correlation  between political  freedom and liberalization
could be that both variables are strongly associated with an unidentified latent variable such as
income.  But Pearson and Spearman correlations between each of these variables and (purchasing
power parity) per  capita GDP in 1989 are lower (0.39 for both in the case of liberalization and
0.47 and 0.48 respectively in the case of political freedom) than those between the two variables
themselves (0.75 and 0.79 respectively).  The lower correlations between political freedom and
income levels are  consistent with  the  failure  of global  cross-country  research  to  establish a
systematic relationship between political freedom and economic growth (Helliwell 1994).  They
also suggest a need to look more closely at the relationship between political change and reform
at  the  individual  country  level  to  understand  the  particular  circumstances  of  the  transition
economies.
In  CEE/FSU  countries  where  former  communist  party  leaders  have  held  power
continuously (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine), reforms have been slow and
driven largely by macroeconomic pressures arising from the breakup of the USSR and attempts
to  maintain the status  quo.  In  countries  where  there  was a  clear  break  with  the previous
communist regime (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Albania, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia),
liberalization has been most radical, as reflected in a rapid change in the annual LI from near
zero to close to one during a phase of "extraordinary politics" (Balcerowicz 1993).  So far, there
has been little reversal of such movements to liberalize, even where "socialist" political parties
have regained control (as in Lithuania, Poland, Hungary and Estonia).'
Where power has  been shared among a broad  spectrum of political  interests (Russia,
Bulgaria),  or where local governments have opposed reforms  initiated from  the top (Russia),
reforms  have typically been halting and sometimes inconsistent,  placing such countries in the
intermediate category.  In Bulgaria,  for example,  initial liberalization of internal and external
43  The Pearson correlation coefficient for political freedom and the CLI for CEE/FSU countries is 0.75  and statistically very
significant.  The correlation for the CLI and level of development,  as measured by purchasing power parity per capita income
in 1989, is lower at 0.4,  but also statistically significant.
4  The lack of reversal  is consistent with the view of Aslund 1994 that democratization checks the power of the old elite.25
markets,  impelled by  a  particularly  difficult  macroeconomic  situation,  was  not  matched by
corresponding  progress  on  private  sector  entry.  Moldova  offers  a  similar  experience.  In
contrast,  unlike  most non-Baltic FSU countries,  Russia and the Kyrgyz  Republic reforms  in
support of private sector entry have moved almost as fast as other reforms.  Mongolia has also
moved quickly on private sector entry, with the first comprehensive privatization program among
intermediate reformers,  even though its initial reforms  of internal and external markets  were
halting.
The example of China and Vietnam appear to contradict the link between political and
economic  reform.  China  and  Vietnam  have  liberalized economically  while  retaining  strict
controls on political rights and civil liberties, and the inclusion of China and Vietnam results in
a drop in the rank correlation coefficient to .62.  However, continuity in leadership at the center
masks a  substantial  decentralization of  political  power  to  provincial and  local  governments.
China experts would probably agree that this political decentralization has played a central role
in economic liberalization since the start of agricultural reforms  in 1978.  In Vietnam, the 1989
"renovation" reforms  were followed by implicit decentralization of economic decision-making
through emphasis on initiative at the local level.  In both cases, the East Asia model of gradual,
decentralized,  economic  transition  appears  to  have  a  political  counterpart,  even  if  it is  not
political freedom per se.
Although the above discussion focuses on the effect of political freedom on economic
reform,  the direction  of  causality  is actually  two-way.  Economic  liberalization  has  strong
political implications;  it is an essential  step in breaking  the power of established  structures,
especially line ministries  which  previously controlled  industry and  trade.  This  is true even
where liberalization does not lead to replacement of the political and managerial elite. 45
VIII.  CONCLUSIONS  AND IMPLICATIONS  FOR  POLICY  DEBATES
Conclusions
Countries in CEE and the FSU differ in many respects, and their transitional experience
also varies  widely.  Nevertheless,  the  above analysis  suggests strong  common patterns  for
countries at similar stages of reform.  The common legacy and the associated changes resulting
from  initial disruptions  in  the  socialist  economic  coordinating  mechanisms  and  subsequent
liberalization measures go a long way toward explaining the transition experience.
4  With the exception  of East Germany  (where loyalty  and competency  tests were imposed),  and Czechoslovakia  (where  a
process of lustration  was applied), leading communists  and managers have typically  been able to take advantage  of political
connections  and technical  expertise  to redefine  their role towards  commerce  and business  management.  See, for example,  Rona-
Tas 1994.26
Reform can be usefully  though of as encompassing  the duration as well as the intensity
of economic  liberalization,  as defined by the liberalization  of internal and external markets and
facilitation of private sector entry.  Analysis based on countries' cumulative liberalization
provides a  useful insight into country experience with  growth, including the  "transitional
recession."  Liberalization  has been an important element of stabilization  policy, even though
its initial impact entails a spurt in prices, and even though liberalization is by no means a
sufficient  condition for regaining  price stability.
The necessity, if not the inevitability,  of liberalization  derives from the weakening of
governments  that initiated  a process of political  glasnost as well as economic  opening  up.  This
precluded the application  of direct controls  that would  have been needed  to stabilize  unreformed
systems,  where enterprises  were not separated  from government. The close relationship  between
economic  liberalization  and political  freedom helps  to explain  why some  countries moved  more
quickly on reforms and others did not.
An examination  of the macroeconomic  and sectoral patterns underlying this aggregate
experience  confirms the usefulness  of classifying  countries  by stage of reform and suggests  that
many developments  are bi-directional in nature.  In advanced reformers, liberalization  has
permitted  the reallocation  of capital and labor from industry  towards services and an associated
return to positive growth from the expansion  of previously  repressed sectors. While the severe
macroeconomic  imbalances  that built up in the last years of the Soviet  Union are a costly legacy,
the main problem  in stabilization  is continuing  monetization  of the fiscal and quasi-fiscal  deficits,
associated with attempts to maintain employment under the old system.  Recent experience
suggests that stabilization policy can be surprisingly powerful in  FSU countries (Kyrgyz
Republic, Moldova), but these countries will remain fragile until structural reforms take hold
and resources for restructuring  become  available.
Policy implications
The above findings  have several implications  for recent policy debates:
Stabilization  as a priority.  These patterns shed light on a number of questions raised
by  other studies.  Portes 1994 and others have argued that policies have overemphasized
stabilization  relative to structural reforn.  Although it is hard to respond to this view at a
general level when the circumstances-say between Ukraine and the Czech Republic-differ
substantially at  the  country level,  it  seems to  us  that  such arguments miss  the  strong
complementarity  between macro and micro policy and the high apparent costs of sustained
inflation  in the slow-reforming  countries.
The empirical analysis in this paper supports Ickes and Ryterman 1994 and Balcerowicz
and Gelb 1994, who  maintain  that strong interactions  between liberalization  and stabilization  are
expected. It also supports  the conclusions  of Easterly  and Bruno 1994, who have  found evidence
in other countries that neither the effective  functioning  of markets nor renewed investment  is27
possible  with severe macroeconomic  price instability;  thus, stabilization  becomes  a priority for
the  resumption of  growth.  Further,  the  analysis in  this paper  suggests output costs of
stabilization  has not been large.  At the same time, it should be recognized that stabilization  is
rendered more difficult by severe output contractions  during the early stages of liberalization;
such contractions  reduce potential  tax revenues and raise claims on fiscal resources  to cushion
the effects.  Stabilization  is also rendered difficult by the absence of external financing and by
the large depreciations  in the exchange rate that accompany  the early stages of liberalization.
Big bang  versus gradualist approach.  A continuing debate has  been whether or  not
countries should follow a "big bang" or gradualist approach to reform.  Two points can be
made.  First,  the close relationship between economic liberalization and political freedom
suggests that it may be unrealistic to expect a given regime to perceive, or in fact to have, a
very wide range of options. Second, the time profiles estimated  here suggest  that to the extent
that regimes do perceive or have options, rapid reform is preferable to slow reform, given the
breakdown  in the central planning  apparatus.  The status quo was not a viable option for CEE
and FSU countries.  Recorded inflation and output losses in countries that have managed to
postpone adjustment are now far larger than in the more advanced reformers, even though
transfers from Russia cushioned the terms of trade shocks for several other non-Baltic  FSU
countries into 1993.
Fiscal  constraint  on reform. Many analysts  have  emphasized  the need  for tight and active
fiscal policies,  to support  stabilization  and enterprise restructuring;  they have  also underlined  the
importance of  quickly reforming the  tax system. 46 At the  same time, fiscal deficits are
expected to increase. The "transitional  recession"  and lags associated  with the development  of
a new tax system are expected to result in a fall in revenues in the short run.  And social
expenditures  are expected to increase as they are transferred from enterprises to the budget.
Some observers have in fact argued  or implied  that there is a "fiscal  constraint"  to rapid
reform (Chadha and Coricelli 1994 and Aghion and Blanchard  1994).  These studies note that
there are fiscal costs, associated  with closing or restructuring  state enterprises, that need to be
offset by revenues generated from new private businesses.  Otherwise, the budget balance
deteriorates as  reforms  are  implemented; revenues from  state enterprises decline while
unemployment  benefits increase. These studies further note that tax rates on the private sector
need to be low in order not to discourage growth; so, meeting a target budget deficit may
require measures to sustain state enterprises,  the traditional  tax base.
The cross-country  comparisons  carried out here suggest  a different  conclusion. As noted
above, fiscal revenues and expenditures have tended to  remain high, relative to  GDP, in
advanced reformers, and  fiscal deficits have been noticeably smaller than in  the  slower
reformers.  Even if there are  reasons-cultural,  institutional, or structural-why  the fiscal
4  See Fischer and Gelb 1991; Bruno 1993; Kopits 1991,  1993; Tanzi  1991, 1993; Balcerowicz and Gelb 1994; and Sachs
1994.28
position is stronger in advanced reformers,  there is no convincing evidence that a slower pace
of  reform  has  strengthened  the  fiscal  position  of  intermediate  reformers. 47 As  suggested
earlier, the lack of adjustment by state enterprises in the face of structural shifts in demand may
result in negative value added for many of these enterprises,  and therefore  no taxable profits.
The failure  of slow reformers  to maintain fiscal  balance is highlighted by the fact that their
consolidated fiscal plus quasi-fiscal deficits are even worse than those of intermediate reformers.
Choice of nominal anchors in stabilization programs.  Substantial debate surrounds the
choice of nominal anchors  in stabilization programs  (Sachs 1994, Sahay and Vegh  1995, and
Citrin et al.  1995)  The main choice has been between a money anchor and an exchange rate
anchor, both often used in combination with restrictions on public sector wages; and the debate
has been primarily over whether greater reliance should have been placed on the exchange rate
anchor.  The uncertainty of changes in money demand, the adequacy of foreign reserves and the
role of the chosen anchor in signaling and establishing credibility are seen as choice factors.  At
the same time, it should be recognized that both money and exchange rate anchors have proven
to be effective in a variety of stabilization programs  in transition countries.  This is consistent
with the evidence here suggesting that the most critical factor for the success of stabilization in
transition countries is likely to be the extent of economic liberalization irrespective of nominal
anchor  choice.  As  discussed  widely  in  the  literature,  what  is  critical  for  the  success of
stabilization programs  is their credibility  and  in the context of  transition credibility  does not
come without extensive liberalization.
Unemployment as an indicator of reform.  The strong association of unemployment with
the CLI noted here supports Phelps et al  1994, who find rising  unemployment to be a good
indicator of transition.  The higher levels of unemployment recorded  in CEE,  as compared to
FSU,  countries  is  also consistent  with  the differences,  pointed  out  by other  researchers,  in
incentives to register  for unemployment and the extent to which firms respond through formal
layoffs, to decreases in activity.  The Kyrgyz Republic, one of the leading reformers in the FSU,
also seems to be exhibiting similar employment patterns.  Windell, Anker, and Sziracki (1995)
show that enterprise employment fell by a third between 1991-94 which is consistent with rising
unemployment data reported by the World Bank (1995).
"  It is certainly  possible, for example, that the institutional  infrastructure  (tax code, tax administration,  expenditure  control)
and general conditions  of societal  order and compliance  are stronger  in advanced  reformers.29
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APPENDIX
THE LIBERALIZATION INDEX AND HOW IT WAS DERIVED
The attached  table gives  the Cumulative  Liberalization  Index (CLI), as well as the annual
Liberalization  Index (LU)  and its components,  for the 28 countries  included  in this study. It also
shows,  in the last column, the CLI normalized  to reflect the number  of Poland-equivalent  reform
years; this normalized  CLI is used in the switching  regime regressions in Section V.
An extensive  process of consultation  was followed  in assigning  annual country rankings
for each component  of the LI.  First, the authors proposed rankings on the basis of their own
knowledge  and country reports.  Second, the authors consulted  World Bank and other country
specialists  on a country's pace of reforms over time and on its ranking  relative  to other transition
countries  known by the specialist. Third, revised rankings were submitted to a second round
of comments  from relatively senior experts who have a comparative  perspective  across a wider
range of countries. And fourth, for the 25 countries  in CEE and FSU, a further  adjustment  was
made based on the transition  indicators in the EBRD's 1994 Transition  Regor  (Table 2.1) and
the accompanying  text.  This adjustment  was designed to introduce further objectivity  into the
country  rankings;  the accompanying  matrix describes  the correspondence  between  the transition
indicators  and the LI components.
In the final analysis, the rankings reflect the authors' judgment.  Individual  errors in
judgment  no doubt exist, but we believe  the general picture of economic  liberalization  suggested
by the country rankings over time is reasonable.37
Correspondence  of the 1994  Liberalization  Index Components
with EBRD  Report Indicators
EBRD  Indicators  1994
Trade and
Price  Foreign
Liberalization and  Exchange  Large-scale  Small-scale  Banking
1994 Li Components  Competition  System  Privatization  Privatization  Reform
I (internal  prices)  Xa
E (external markets)  Xb
P (private sector entry) c/  X  X  X
Source:  EBRD,  Transition Report, 1  994.
a/ I is further differentiated  to reflect the status of state trading.
b/ E is further differentiated  on basis  of Chapter  8 in the EBRD  report.
c/ P is calculated  as the sum of the indicator values,  where banking  reform is used as a proxy for a favorable
environment  for private sector development.Appendix: Indices of Liberalization
Group  Country  Index  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  Total NormalizedCLI
1  Slovenia  I  0.6  0.7  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  4.9
E  0.5  0.7  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.9  4.7
P  0.2  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.7  3.2
Weighted  0.41  0.62  0.71  0.78  0.82  0.82  4.16  5.02
1  Poland  I  0.2  0.7  0.7  0.9  0.9  0.9  4.3
E  0.2  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  4.7
P  0.3  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.8  3.6
Weighted  0.24  0.68  0.72  0.82  0.82  0.86  4.14  5.00
I  Hungary  1  0.5  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  4.9
E  0.5  0.7  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  4.8
P  0.1  0.3  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  3
Weighted  0.34  0.57  0.74  0.78  0.82  0.86  4.11  4.96
1  Czech  Rep  I  0  0  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  3.6
E  0  0  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.9  3.5
P  0  0.4  0.7  0.8  0.9  0.9  3.7
Weighted  0  0.16  0.79  0.86  0.9  0.9  3.61  4.36
1  Slovakia  I  0  0  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  3.6
E  0  0  0.8  0.9  0.8  0.8  3.3
P  0  0.4  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.8  3.5
Weighted  0  0.16  0.79  0.86  0.83  0.83  3.47  4.19
2  Estonia  I  0.1  0.3  0.5  0.9  0.9  0.9  3.6
E  0  0.1  0.3  0.7  1  1  3.1
P  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  2.3
Weighted  0.07  0.2  0.32  0.64  0.81  0.89  2.93  3.54Appendix:  Indices  of Liberalization
Group  Country  Index  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  Total  Normalized CLI
2  Bulgaria  I  0  0  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.8  3.5
E  0.3  0.5  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.8  4.3
P  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.4  1.4
Weighted  0.13  0.19  0.62  0.66  0.66  0.64  2.9  3.50
2  Lithuania  I  0  0.3  0.5  0.8  0.9  0.9  3.4
E  0  0  0.2  0.5  0.9  1  2.6
P  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.4  0.6  0.8  2.3
Weighted  0.04  0.13  0.33  0.5S  0.78  0.89  2.72  3.29
2  Latvia  I  0  0.3  0.5  0.8  0.9  0.9  3.4
E  0  0  0.2  0.5  0.8  1  2.5
P  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.6  1.7
Weighted  0.04  0.13  0.29  0.51  0.67  0.81  2.45  2.96
2  Albania  I  0  0  0.2  0.9  0.9  0.9  2.9
E  0  0  0.2  0.9  0.9  0.9  2.9
P  0  0  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.4  1.4
Weighted  0  0  0.24  0.66  0.7  0.7  2.3  2.78
2  Romania  I  0  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.7  0.8  3
E  0  0.1  0.3  0.6  0.7  0.8  2.5
P  0  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.5  1.6
Weighted  0  0.22  0.36  0.45  0.58  0.68  2.29  2.77
2  Mongolia  I  0  0  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  2.2
E  0  0  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.6  1.9
P  0  0  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.7  2.6
Weighted  0  0  0.44  0.55  0.61  0.67  2.27  2.74Appendix: Indices of Liberalization
Group  Country  Index  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  Total  Normalized CLI
3  Russia  I  0  0  0.1  0.6  0.7  0.7  2.1
E  0  0  0.1  0.5  0.6  0.7  1.9
P  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.4  0.5  0.6  1.8
Weighted  0.04  0.04  0.1  0.49  0.59  0.66  1.92  2.32
3  Kyrgyzstan  I  0  0  0  0.3  0.6  0.8  1.7
E  0  0  0  0.4  0.6  0.8  1.8
P  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.6  0.7  1.9
Weighted  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.33  0.6  0.76  1.81  2.19
3  Moldova  I  0  0  0.1  0.5  0.7  0.7  2
E  0  0  0.1  0.5  0.6  0.6  1.8
P  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  1.2
Weighted  0.04  0.04  0.1  0.38  0.51  0.55  1.62  1.96
3  Kazakhstan  I  0  0  0.1  0.5  0.5  0.5  1.6
E  0  0  0.1  0.4  0.4  0.4  1.3
P  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  1.1
Weighted  0.04  0.04  0.14  0.35  0.35  0.39  1.31  1.58
4  Uzbekistan  I  0  0  0  0.4  0.4  0.5  1.3
E  0  0  0  0.2  0.2  0.4  0.8
P  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  1.2
Weighted  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.26  0.3  0.43  1.11  1.34
4  Belarus  I  0  0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  1
E  0  0  0.1  0.2  0.4  0.4  1.1
P  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.3  1.1
Weighted  0.04  0.04  0.1  0.2  0.33  0.36  1.07  1.29Appendix: Indices of Liberalization
Group  Country  Index  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  Total Normalized  CLI
4  Ukraine  I  0  0  0.1  0.3  0.2  0.4  1
E  0  0  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.6
P  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.8
Weighted  0.04  0.04  0.1  0.23  0.13  0.26  0.8  0.97
4  Turkmenistan  I  0  0  0  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.9
E  0  0  0  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.4
p  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.6
Weighted  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.13  0.16  0.22  0.63  0.76
"WAR"  Croatia  I  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.9  0.9  4.6
E  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.9  4.4
P  0.2  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.7  3.2
Weighted  0.41  0.62  0.62  0.72  0.79  0.82  3.98  4.81
"WAR"  FYR Macedonia I  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.9  0.9  4.6
E  0.5  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.9  0.9  4.6
p  0.2  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.8  0.6  2.9
Weighted  0.41  0.62  0.65  0.68  0.78  0.78  3.92  4.73
"WAR"  Armenia  I  0  0  0.2  0.5  0.6  0.6  1.9
E  0  0  0.1  0.4  0.4  0.4  1.3
P  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.3  1.2
Weighted  0.04  0.04  0.13  0.39  0.42  0.42  1.44  1.74
"WAR"  Georgia  I  0  0  0.3  0.5  0.6  0.6  2
E  0  0  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  1.2
P  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.9
Weighted  0.04  0.04  0.22  0.32  0.35  0.35  1.32  1.59Appendix: Indices of Liberalization
Group  Country  Index  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  Total  Normalized CLI
"WAR"  Azerbaijan  I  0  0  0  0.5  0.7  0.7  1.9
E  0  0  0  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.6
P  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.7
Weighted  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.25  0.31  0.35  1.03  1.24
"WAR"  Tajikistan  I  0  0  0.1  0.4  0.5  0.5  1.5
E  0  0  0  0  0.1  0.1  0.2
P  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  1.1
Weighted  0.04  0.04  0.11  0.2  0.26  0.3  0.95  1.15
East  Viet Nam  I  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.8  4.3
Aisa  E  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.6  3.1
P  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  3
Weighted  0.53  0.53  0.56  0.59  0.59  0.62  3.42  4.13
East  China  I  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.7  3.7
Asia  E  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.6  3.1
P  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5  2.6
Weighted  0.46  0.49  0.49  0.49  0.56  0.59  3.08  3.7243
TABLE  1: FROM  PLAN  TO MARKET:
The Common  Legacy
and Systemic  Change  during  Transition
Changes  Occurring
Common  Legacy  during  Transition
1. Macrobalance  by direct control  Macroeconomic  destabilization
2. Coordination  through  plans  Output  declines  resulting  from disruption
in the coordinating  mechanism
3. Little  private ownership  OutDut  oains  from private  ownership
and private  sector  growth
4. Distorted  relative  prices  Microeconomic  and sectoral  reallocations44
TABLE 2:
Liberalization,  Growth  and Inflation,  1989-94
CLI  Av lib  Av infl  Av growth  93/94  GDP  Lowest  level
Group  Countries  1994  93/94  93/94  93/94  /89 GOP  of GDP/89  GDP
Advanced  Slovenia  4.16  0.82  26  3.0  84  81
Reformers  Poland  4.14  0.84  34  4.2  88  82
Hungary  4.11  0.84  21  0.0  81  80
Czech  Rep  3.61  0.90  16  0.8  81  80
Slovakia  3.53  0.86  19  0.4  79  77
Averages  3.91  0.85  23  1.7  83  80
High  Bulgaria  2.96  0.68  81  -1.4  73  73
Intermediate  Estonia  2.93  0.85  69  0.9  69  67
Reformers  Lithuania  2.62  0.79  231  -7.3  44  44
Latvia  2.39  0.71  73  -4.4  60  59
Romania  2.35  0.66  194  2.2  69  67
Albania  2.30  0.70  57  9.5  74  65
Mongolia  2.27  0.64  164  0.6  84  83
Averages  2.55  0.72  124  0.03  68  65
Low  Russia  1.92  0.63  558  -13.5  57  52
Intermediate  Kyrgyzstan  1.81  0.68  744  -13.2  61  57
Reformers  Moldova  1.62  0.53  558  -17.0  53  46
Kazakhstan  1.31  0.37  1870  -18.5  57  49
Averages  1.67  0.55  933  -15.6  57  51
Slow  Uzbekistan  1.11  0.37  640  -2.5  89  88
Reformers  Belarus  1.07  0.35  1694  -16.6  73  64
Ukraine  0.80  0.20  2789  -18.6  56  48
Turkmenistan  0.63  0.19  2751  -15.0  69  62
Averages  0.90  0.27  1968  -13.2  72  66
Affected  Croatia  4.02  0.83  807  -0.7  69  68
by  War  FYR Macedonia  3.92  0.78  157  -10.7  57  55
Armenia  1.44  0.42  4595  -7.4  38  38
Georgia  1.32  0.35  10563  -24.6  24  23
Azerbaijan  1.03  0.33  1167  -17.7  50  44
Tajikistan  0.95  0.28  1324  -26.3  35  30
Averages  2.11  0.50  3102  -14.5  45  34
East  Viet Nam  3.42  0.78  10  8.5  145  100
Asia  China  3.08  0.64  13  11.7  157  100
Averages  3.25  0.71  11  10.1  151  100
Note:  CLI = cumulative  liberalization  index.45
TABLE  3:
Inflation  Experience  by Reform  Group,  1989-94
Geometric
Cumul  Inflation  average
Group  Countries  Lib Index  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  89-94
Advanced  Slovenia  4.2  1306.0  549.7  117.7  201.0  32.0  19.8  213.3
Reformers  Poland  4.1  251.0  586.0  70.3  43.0  35.3  32.2  117.2
Hungary  4.1  17.0  29.0  34.2  22.9  22.5  19.0  24.0
Czech  Republic  3.6  2.3  10.8  56.7  11.1  20.8  10.2  17.5
Slovak Republic  3.5  0.0  10.8  61.2  10.1  23.0  14.0  18.4
Averages  3.9  315.3  237.3  68.0  57.6  26.7  19.0  78.1
High  Bulgaria  3.0  6.0  22.0  333.5  82.0  72.8  89.0  79.4
Intermediate  Estonia  2.9  6.1  23.1  210.6  1069.0  89.0  48.0  125.8
Reformers  Lithuania  2.6  2.1  8.4  224.7  1020.3  390.2  72.0  164.1
Latvia  2.4  4.7  10.5  124.4  951.2  109.0  36.0  106.5
Romania  2.4  1.1  5.1  174.5  210.9  256.0  131.0  105.2
Albania  2.3  0.0  0.0  35.5  225.9  85.0  28.0  47.9
Mongolia  2.3  0.0  0.0  208.6  321.0  183.0  145.0  111.7
Averages  2.5  2.9  9.9  187.4  554.3  169.3  78.4  105.8
Low  Russia  1.9  2.2  5.6  92.7  1353.0  896.0  220.0  214.3
Intermediate  Kyrgyz  Republic  1.8  0.0  3.0  85.0  854.6  1208.7  280.0  211.0
Reformers  Moldova  1.6  0.0  4.2  98.0  1276.0  789.0  327.0  220.2
Kazakhstan  1.3  0.0  4.2  91.0  1610.0  1760.0  1980.0  385.9
Averages  1.7  0.6  4.3  91.7  1273.4  1163.4  701.8  257.8
Slow  Uzbekistan  1.1  0.7  3.1  82.2  645.0  534.0  746.0  201.8
Reformers  Belarus  1.1  1.7  4.5  83.5  969.0  1188.0  2200.0  328.3
Ukraine  0.8  2.0  4.0  91.2  1210.0  4735.0  842.0  379.2
Turkmenistan  0.6  2.1  4.6  102.5  492.9  3102.0  2400.0  366.2
Averages  0.9  1.6  4.1  89.9  829.2  2389.8  1547.0  318.9
Affected  Croatia  4.0  2520.5  135.6  249.5  938.2  1516.0  98.0  544.5
by War  FYR Macedonia  3.9  1246.0  120.5  229.7  1925.2  248.0  65.0  374.3
Armenia  1.4  0.0  10.3  100.0  825.0  3732.0  5458.0  492.9
Georgia  1.3  0.0  3.3  78.5  913.0  3126.0  18000.0  591.2
Azerbaijan  1.0  0.0  7.8  105.6  616.0  833.0  1500.0  265.1
Tajikistan  1.0  0.0  4.0  111.6  1157.0  2195.0  452.0  289.7
Averages  2.1  627.8  46.9  145.8  1062.4  1941.7  4262.2  426.3
East  Viet Nam  3.4  76.0  67.5  67.6  17.5  5.2  14.4  38.3
Asia  China  3.1  17.5  1.6  3.0  5.4  13.0  12.0  8.6
Averages  3.3  46.8  34.6  35.3  11.5  9.1  13.2  23.4
Sources:  World Bank, IMF46
TABLE  4:
Switching  Regressions,  1989-94  a
Growth  Log Inflation
Coefficients  Profile '  Coefficients  Profile/
5 years before  reform  14.2  (6.7)  1.6  -4.4  (10.6)  1.6
4 years before  reform  8.3  (3.7)  -4.3  -4.1  (9.3)  1.9
3 years before  reform  2.5  (1.1)  -10.1  -1.5  (3.2)  4.5
2 years before  reform  -6.6  (2.5)  -19.2  0.4  (0.7)  6.4
1 year before  reform  2.8  (0.8)  -9.8  1  (1.5)  7.0
1st  year  of reform  (intercept)  -12.6  (8.3)  -12.6  6  (20.2)  6.0
2nd year  of reform  5.6  (2.5)  -7.0  -0.7  (1.6)  5.3
3rd year  of reform  11.3  (4.5)  -1.3  -2.1  (4.3)  3.9
4th year  of reform  13.8  (4.7)  1.2  -2.3  (4.0)  3.7
5th yearof reform  15.5  (4.2)  2.9  -2.9  (4.0)  3.1
WAR  -9  (4.7)  -21.6  1.4  (3.7)  7.4
R-square  0.51  0.65
Adjusted  R-square  0.48  0.63
a/ Regressions  are based  on 26 observations;  t statistics  are shown  in parenthesis.
b/ Coefficient  plus  intercept:  This is predicted  annual  growth  or inflation  rate.47
TABLE  5:
Net  Extemal  Financing  and  Fixed  Investment
Current  Account  2/  Fixed  Investment
Cumul  Average  Level  Change  Level
Group  Countries  Lib  Index  1989-94  1994  1989-94  1994
Advanced  Slovenia  4.16  3.4  4.0  1.0  19.0
Reformers  Poland  4.14  -1.0  -1.0  -0.8  15.6
Hungary  4.11  -3.0  -9.9  1.3  21.4
Czech  Republic  3.61  -0.5  0.0  -5.6  20.4
Slovak  Republic  3.53  0.7  5.8  -14.3  15.4
Averages  3.91  -0.1  -0.2  -3.7  18.4
High  Bulgaria  2.96  -2.5  1.4  -7.3  18.8
Intermediate  Estonia  b'  2.93  -1.8  -4.4  -6.0  23.0
Reformers  Lithuania  2.62  3.6  -4.7  -14.0  18.0
Latvia  PI  2.39  0.4  -2.0  -19.8  11.2
Romania  2.35  -3.4  -2.4  -9.0  21.0
Albania  2.30  -9.2  -8.3  -16.0  12.6
Mongolia  PI  2.27  -19.5  -5.6  -23.1  20.9
Averages  2.55  -4.6  -3.7  -13.6  17.9
Low  Russia  1.90  -0.1  -0.3  -8.0  24.0
Intermediate  Kyrgyz  Republic  b/  1.81  -15.9  -19.6  -19.0  13.0
Reformers  Moldova  c/  1.62  -4.8  -9.2  -4.0  14.0
Kazakhstan  s/  1.31  -6.6  -7.4  -15.0  22.0
Averages  1.67  -6.9  -9.1  -11.5  18.3
Slow  Uzbekistan  1.11  -0.8  -2.0  -5.0  26.0
Reformers  Belarus  PI  1.07  -5.2  -8.9  5.0  27.8
Ukraine  0.80  -1.3  -1.8  n.a.  3.0
Turkmenistan  c/  0.63  1.1  -14.0  -24.3  3.0
Averages  0.90  -1.6  -6.7  -8.2  15.0
Affected  Croatia  4.02  2.4  0.3  0.5  14.3
by War  FYR  Macedonia  3.92  -11.9  -4.1  0.0  17.0
Armenia  1.44  -16.0  -36.6  -16.5  10.0
Georgia c/  1.32  -19.1  -45.1  -8.0  16.0
Azerbaijan  1.03  -2.1  -15.6  -3.6  17.8
Tajikistan  0.95  -20.0  -14.0  n.a.  n.a.
Averages  2.11  -13.8  -27.8  -5.5  15.0
East  Viet Nam  3.42  5.6  -7.2  10.2  24.2
Asia  China  3.08  1.8  7.2  8.9  36.5
Averages  3.25  3.7  0.0  9.6  30.5
a/ For  FSU,  change  is over  1991-94.
b/ For  fixed  investment,  change  is over  1989-93  and  level  for 1993.
c/ For  fixed  investment,  change  is over  1989-92  and  level  for 1992.
Source:  IMF,  World  Bank48
TABLE  6:
Registered  Unemployment  through  Transition
(as percentage  of labor  force, end  of year)
Group  Country  CLI  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
Advanced  Slovenia2/  4.16  2.9  4.7  8.2  11.1  14.5  14.5
Reformers  Poland  4.14  0.1  6.1  11.8  13.6  16.4  16.0
Hungary  4.11  0.3  2.5  8.0  12.3  12.1  10.9
Czech  Republic  3.61  0.0  0.8  4.1  2.6  3.5  3.2
Slovakia  3.53  0.0  1.5  11.8  10.4  14.4  14.8
Averages  3.91  0.7  3.1  8.8  10.0  12.2  11.9
High  Bulgaria  2.96  0.0  1.5  11.1  15.3  16.4  12.8
Intermediate  Estonia  2.93  0.0  0.0  0.1  4.8  8.8  8.1
Reformers  Lithuania  2.62  0.0  0.0  0.3  1.3  4.4  3.8
Latvia  2.39  0.0  0.0  0.1  2.1  5.3  6.5
Romania  2.35  0.0  0.0  3.0  8.4  10.2  10.9
Albania  2.30  1.9  7.7  8.6  26.9  28.9  19.5
Averages  2.59  0.3  1.5  3.9  9.8  12.3  10.3
Low  Russia  1.92  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.8  1.1  2.2
Intermediate  Kyrgyzstan  1.81  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.7
Reformers  Moldova  1.62  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.8  1.2
Kazakhstan  1.31  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.5  0.6  1.0
Averages  1.67  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.5  0.7  1.3
Slow  Uzbekistan  1.10  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3
Reformers  Belarus  1.07  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.5  1.5  2.1
Ukraine  0.80  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.4  0.4
Turkmenistan  0.63  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  n.a.
Averages  0.90  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.5  0.9
Affected  Croatia  4.02  0.0  9.3  15.5  17.8  17.5  18.0
by War  FYR  Macedonia  a/  3.92  n.a.  n.a.  18.0  19.0  19.0  19.0
Armenia  1.44  1.0  1.0  3.5  3.5  6.2  5.6
Georgia  1.32  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.4  8.4  n.a.
Azerbaijan  1.03  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.7  0.9
Tajikistan  0.95  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  1.1  1.7
Averages  2.11  0.2  1.7  6.2  7.7  8.8  9.0
East  Viet Nam  3.42  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a
Asia  China  3.08  2.6  2.5  2.3  2.3  2.6  2.8
Averages  3.25  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a
CLI  = Cumulative  Liberalization  Index.
a/  Annual average
Source:  World Bank, IMF, Transition report, EBRD,  1995.49
TABLE 7a:
Sectoral  Shifts  at Current Prices, 1989-94
Change in share
Cumul  % of GDP
Group  Countries  Lib Index  Industry  Agriculture  Services
Advanced  Slovenia  a/  4.16  -5.8  0.0  5.8
Reformers  Poland  4.14  -14.6  -7.2  21.8
Hungary  4.11  -4.6  -7.2  11.8
Czech  Republict-  3.61  -8.7  -2.3  11.0
Slovak Republic  3.53  -22.5  -1.6  24.1
Averages  3.91  -11.2  -3.7  14.9
High  Bulgaria  2.96  -25.0  1.7  23.3
Intermediate  Estonia  b'  2.93  -8.4  -10.0  18.4
Reformers  Lithuania '  2.62  -3.4  -6.7  10.1
Latvia  b  2.39  -13.1  -4.3  17.4
Romania  2.35  -20.8  5.2  15.6
Albania  2.30  -20.1  14.8  5.3
Mongolia  2.27  13.5  4.0  -17.5
Averages  2.55  -11.0  0.7  10.4
Low  Russia  1.90  -7.8  -10.3  18.1
Intermediate  Kyrgyz Republic  1.81  -11.9  1.8  10.1
R-eformers  Moldova  1.62  -0.3  7.5  -7.2
Kazakhstan  1.31  12.3  -18.5  6.2
Averages  1.66  -1.9  -4.9  6.8
Slow  Uzbekistan  1.11  -5.8  -2.6  8.4
Reformers  Belarus  91  1.07  6.2  -5.6  -0.6
Ukraine  0.80  -12.2  17.1  -4.9
Turkmenistang'  0.63  23.4  -14.6  -8.8
Averages  0.90  2.9  -1.4  -1.5
Affected  Croatia  8'  4.02  2.1  2.1  -4.2
by War  FYR  Macedonia  V'  3.92  0.2  4.2  -4.4
Armenia  1.44  -27.4  44.5  -17.1
Georgia  9'  1.32  -21.1  36.6  -15.5
Azerbaijan  D'  1.03  -2.8  -1.6  4.4
Tajikistan  l  0.95  1.5  6.2  -7.7
Averages  2.11  -7.9  15.3  -7.4
East  Viet Nam  3.42  1.8  -12.8  11.0
Asia  China  3.08  4.2  -8.7  4.5
Averages  3.25  3.0  -10.8  7.8
a/  Change  over 1990-94.
b/  Change  over 1989-93.
c/  Change  over 1989-91.
Source:  World  Bankso
TABLE 7b:
Sectoral Shifts at Constant Prices, 1989-94
Change in share
Cumul  % of GDP
Group  Countries  Lib Index  Industry  Agriculture  Services
Advanced  Slovenian'  4.16  -23.3  -3.8  27.1
Reformers  Poland  '  4.14  -21.4  -2.0  23.4
Hungary  4.11  -0.2  -1.7  1.9
Czech Republic  3.61  -10.5  -0.5  11.0
Slovak Republic  3.53  -14.8  0.2  14.6
Averages  3.91  -14.0  -1.6  15.6
High  Bulgaria  2.96  -10.3  4.3  6.0
Intermediate  Estoniaa/  2.93  -12.7  -10.1  22.8
Reformers  Lithuanian/  2.62  -11.5  2.6  8.9
Latvia  '  2.39  -18.8  1.9  16.9
Romania  2.35  -6.5  6.2  0.3
Albania  2.30  -20.1  14.8  5.3
Mongolia  2.27  3.0  4.3  -7.3
Averages  2.55  -11.0  3.4  7.6
Low  Russia b/  1.90  3.5  6.5  -10.0
Intermediate  Kyrgyz Republic  1.81  -7.8  7.2  0.6
Reformers  Moldova  1.62  3.5  6.5  -10.0
Kazakhstan  1.31  -6.3  17.5  -11.2
Averages  1.67  -1.8  9.4  -7.7
Slow  Uzbekistan  '  1.11  -7.6  12.7  -5.1
Reformers  Belarus s  1.07  5.8  -2.8  -3.0
Ukraine  0.80  -11.2  10.0  1.2
Turkmenistans/  0.63  -4.5  0.1  4.4
Averages  0.90  -4.4  5.0  -0.6
Affected  Croatia  4.02  -4.0  0.8  3.2
by War  FYR Macedonia  3.92  9.1  -6.0  -3.1
ArmeniaE/  1.44  -6.4  0.0  6.4
Georgia  1.32  -8.7  18.3  -9.6
Azerbaijan  1.03  -14.8  0.2  14.6
Tajikistan  0.95  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Averages  2.11  -5.0  2.7  2.3
East  Viet Nam  3.42  -1.1  -6.0  7.1
Asia  China  3.08  18.6  -6.1  -12.5
Averages  3.25  8.8  -6.1  -2.7
a/  Change over  1989-93
b/  Change over 1989-92
c/  Change over  1989-9151
TABLE  8:
Levels  and Change  in Revenue,  Expenditures  and Fiscal  Balance,  1989-94
Change  in  Levels,  1994
Cumul  (% of  GDP)  (% of  GDP)
Group  Countries  Lib Index  Revenue  Expenditure  Balance  Revenue  Expenditure  Balance
Advanced  Slovenia  4.16  4.6  5.8  -1.2  46.6  47.5  -0.9
Reformers  Poland  4.14  6.5  1.5  5.0  47.9  50.4  -2.5
Hungary  4.11  -6.8  -1.7  -5.1  52.3  58.8  -6.5
Czech  Republic  a'  3.61  -10.9  -13.8  2.9  51.2  50.7  0.5
Slovak  Republic  al  3.53  -11.6  -11.5  -0.1  50.5  53.0  -2.5
Averages  3.91  -3.6  -3.9  0.3  49.7  52.1  -2.4
High  Bulgaria  2.96  -21.9  -17.3  -4.6  38.0  44.1  -6.1
Intermediate  Estonia  2.93  -8.0  -7.5  -0.5  35.0  35.0  0.0
Reformers  Lithuania  2.62  -25.2  -17.1  -8.1  25.1  30.4  -5.3
Latvia  2.39  -15.1  -12.3  -2.8  36.7  38.7  -2.0
Romania  2.35  -18.5  -7.1  -11.4  32.6  35.6  -3.0
Albania  2.30  -20.3  -16.0  -4.3  27.7  41.0  -13.3
Mongolia  2.27  -12.4  -17.3  5.0  36.2  48.0  -11.8
Averages  2.55  -17.3  -13.5  -3.8  33.0  39.0  -5.9
Low  Russia  1.90  -4.5  -4.4  -0.1  36.3  45.1  -8.8
Intermediate  Kyrgyz  Republic  1.81  -14.2  -3.7  -10.4  24.3  32.7  -8.4
Reformers  Moldova  1.62  -18.2  -7.8  -7.1  17.1  25.9  -8.8
Kazakhstan  1.31  -21.7  -15.7  -6.0  19.0  23.5  -4.5
Averages  1.66  -14.6  -7.9  -5.9  24.2  31.8  -7.6
Slow  Uzbekistan  1.11  7.8  9.2  -1.4  43.0  45.0  -2.0
Reformers  Belarus  1.07  -1.6  3.4  -1.5  36.6  38.1  -1.5
Ukraine  0.80  15.9  25.7  -8.4  42.3  51.4  -9.1
Turkmenistan  0.63  -26.2  -23.9  -2.3  6.2  7.3  -1.1
Averages  0.90  -1.0  3.6  -3.4  32.0  35.5  -3.4
Affected  Croatia  b/  4.02  12.3  8.1  4.1  27.2  27.6  -0.4
by  War  FYR Macedonia  3.92  6.6  5.6  1.1  42.8  45.4  -2.6
Armenia  1.44  -15.2  11.2  -21.6  37.0  61.0  -24.0
Georgia  1.32  -16.5  -6.6  -8.1  15.0  24.0  -9.0
Azerbaijan  1.03  10.2  24.7  -11.5  36.0  49.0  -13.0
Tajikistan  0.95  -4.9  -0.5  -1.0  35.4  38.1  -2.7
Averages  2.11  -1.2  7.1  -6.2  32.2  40.9  -8.6
East  Viet  Nam  3.42  8.7  -3.2  5.5  24.7  25.2  -0.5
Asia  China  3.08  -5.1  -4.7  -0.4  11.4  13.3  -1.9
Averages  3.25  1.8  -2.2  2.5  18.1  19.3  -1.2
a/  1 989  figures  for  Czechoslovakia.
b/  Change  over  1991-94
Source: IMF, World BankTABLE 9:
Fiscal Deficits  and Quasi-Fiscal Expenditures for  Selected Countries,  1992-94
(as percentage  of GDP)
Fiscal Deficits  CB Implicit  Subsidy ')  Total
1992  1993  1994  1992  1993  1994  1992  1993  1994
Advanced  Reformers
Poland  6.8  2.9  2.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  6.8  2.9  2.9
Hungary  5.7  7.0  6.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.7  7.0  6.5
Czech Republicb)  0.5  -0.6  -0.5  0.3  0.8  0.1  0.8  0.2  -0.4
Slovakia b)  13.1  7.6  2.5  0.3  1.7  0.0  13.4  9.3  2.5
Intermediate  Reformers
Bulgaria  5.0  11.1  6.1  1.3  0.8  0.7  6.3  11.9  6.8
Estonia c)  -0.5  1.4  0.0  - 0.2  0.3  - 1.6  0.3
Romania  5.5  1.0  3.0  5.9  3.9  0.0  11.4  4.9  3.0
Russiac)  3.4  8.1  8.8  11.3  1.7  0.0  14.7  9.8  8.8
Kazakhstan  7.3  1.2  4.5  32.7  2.6  40.0  7.1  s
Slow  Reformers
Belarusc)  6.4  9.4  1.5  26.5  9.3  3.4  32.9  18.7  4.9
Turkmenistanc)  10.1  3.6  1.1  12.5  21.2  6.4  22.6  24.8  7.5
Uzbekistancl  10.2  8.4  2.0  13.1  18.5  19.0  23.3  26.9  21.0
a) Implicit  subsidy  from  the  Central Bank to  commercial  banks and economy  due to  difference  between  the Central
Bank refinancing  rate and inflation.  Annual  figures  are averages of monthly  (quarterly)  figures
b) For 1992 the  nominal federation  subsidy  is divided  2 to  1 in favor  of the Czech Republic.
c) Calculations  done on quarterly  basis.53
TABLE 10:
Money, Interest Rates and Real Balances
Broad Money
Growth
Cumul  (Average Monthly  Real Money Balances  Discount Rate in Real
Group  Countries  Lib Index  Change 1992-94)  1991=100  Terms, percent (average)
92  93  94  1992-1994  end-1994
Advanced  Slovenia  4.16  5  92  127  164  -3  -1
Reformers  Poland  4.14  3  98  101  104  1  3
Hungary  4.11  2  105  106  102  0  1
Czech Republic  a/  3.61  1  106  104  111  -1  -1
Slovak Republic RI  3.53  1  95  84  86  -1  -1
Averages  3.91  2  99  104  113  -1  0
High  Bulgaria  2.96  4  91  76  68  -3  0
Intermediate  Estonia  !'  2.93  7  25  20  21  n/a  -3
Reformers  Lithuania  2.62  9  30  17  20  n/a  n/a
Latvia  2.39  6  29  28  34  -8  0
Romania  el  2.35  7  63  43  41  -8  12
Albania  2.30  5  82  89  105  -4  2
Mongolia 9/  2.27  6b'  56  36  40  -16  -8
Averages  2.55  6  54  44  47  -8  1
Low  Russia  1.92  15  32  23  16  -17  -2
Intermediate  Kyrgyz Republic  1.81  11  36  16  8  -19  9
Reformers  Moldova  1.62  13  23  9  3  -18  0
Kazakhstan  1.31  19  21  14  8  -31  4
Averages  1.67  15  28  16  9  -21  3
Slow  Uzbekistan  1.11  19  45  53  71  -35  -12
Reformers  Belarus  1.07  20  35  33  17  -34  -5
Ukraine  0.80  22  40  26  13  -29  -40
Turkmenistan  0.63  23  63  73  9  -45  -48
Averages  0.90  21  46  46  28  -36  -26
Affected  Croatia  a/  4.02  16  68  60  76  -9  2
by War  FYR Macedonia  3.92  19 2'  89  91  89  -1  1
Armenia  1.44  24  22  7  2  -33  -26
Georgia  1.32  29  29  24  6  n/a  n/a
Azerbaijan  1.03  17  40  40  19  -40  -52
Tajikistan  0.95  19  39  30  n/a  -30  -16
Averages  2.11  21  48  42  39  -23  -18
East  Viet Nam 2'  3.42  n/a  97  107  n/a  1  0.6
Asia  China  3.08  22E  123  141  168  -5  -5
Averages  3.25  n/a  110  124  n/a  -2  -2.2
NB: The discount rates in real terms are calculated assuming quarterly compounding.  All averages are
simple averages.
a/ Data for 1992 are for the federation.
b/ Broad money growth rate is taken from a quarterly average made monthly by taking a cubic root.
c/ The average discount rate is for 1992-93.  For Vietnam, the lending rate for working capital is used.
d/ The rates for  1992-93 are decompounded on monthly basis.
e/ Average interest rate collected over different types of credit.
f/ The NBE credit auction rate is used for end 1994.
g/ The discount rate used is the clearing and settlement account; a mid point of range is used.54
TABLE  1  1:
Political  Freedom  and  Degree  of Liberalization
Group  Countries  Political  CLI
Freedom  1994
Advanced  Slovenia  6.50  4.16
Reformers  Poland  6.00  4.14
Hungary  6.50  4.11
Czech  Rep  6.50  3.61
Slovakia  5.50  3.53
Averages  6.20  3.91
High  Bulgaria  6.00  2.96
Intermediate  Estonia  5.50  2.93
Reformers  Lithuania  6.00  2.62
Latvia  5.50  2.39
Romania  4.50  2.35
Albania  4.50  2.30
Mongolia  5.50  2.27
Averages  5.36  2.55
Low  Russia  4.50  1.92
Intermediate  Kyrgyzstan  4.50  1.81
Reformers  Moldova  4.00  1.62
Kazakhstan  2.50  1.31
Averages  3.88  1.67
Slow  Uzbekistan  1.00  1.11
Reformers  Belarus  4.00  1.07
Ukraine  4.50  0.80
Turkmenistan  1.00  0.63
Averages  2.63  0.90
Affected  Croatia  4.00  4.02
by War  FYR  Macedonia  4.50  3.92
Armenia  4.50  1.44
Georgia  3.00  1.32
Azerbaijan  2.00  1.03
Tajikistan  1.00  0.95
Averages  3.17  2.11
East  Viet Nam  1.00  3.42
Asia  China  1.00  3.08
Averages  1.00  3.25
Source: See  Appendix  for CLI  (Cumulative  Liberalization  Index).
See  Karatnycky  (1995) for index of political freedom,
which has been  reversed  for ease  of comparison.55
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Source:  See  AppendixFigure  2: Growth and Liberalization





It  Mongolia  Czech Rep
e)  0  -.  ..  . . . ...  ......  .....................  ....  .....  ...... . .....  . ...............  - --
b  n  Slovakia  Hungary
a)  Uzbekistan  /  *  Blai 
Lni







'  -1 0.0
Kyrgyzstan
T/rmenistan  *  *  Russia  y=- 2 6.1 + 12.8x-1.42x 2
Turkmenistan  2
-1 5.0  - /  Belarus  Adj  R  =0.53
/  *  Moldova
*  Ukraine  Kazakhstan
-20.0
0.00  1.00  2.00  3.00  4.00  5.00




Belars *  . Kazakhstan
1000  M-  Belarus  Kyrgyzstan
CV)  Uzbekistan 
RomaOa  Lithuania
100
Alban  a0a  ia  ulgariaia
.EIsbania  *  Estoma  Poland
y  =  1656.7x 2-9 3 5 Slovakia%  Slove
2  Hu-nga2ry
R  =  0.8731  Czech  Rep
10
*1  - I  I  I  IllII
0.00  0.50  1.00  1.50  2.00  2.50  3.00  3.50  4.00  4.50




3  4  2
5  *  0.  0
0  - 2
0
-10
-15  y  -5E-lOx 3 + 5E-06x2 -0.0176x  +  2.1285
R  =  0.605  Turkm
-20
Mold  °  Ukr
-25
1  10  100  1000  10000
Inflation (-1)
a/ Numbers  refer to the cumulative liberalization  index in the year of the observation  of growth59
Figure 5: Growth Profiles for Reform  and Non-Reform'
5  Reform  prototype
5 T  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Yer  ofiefrda  or  non
reform  a Indicate
OC  j^  by  nkmuiad  CLI
-20
a Based  on  26  countries'  regression  coefficients
Figure  6:  Inflation  Profiles  for  Reform  and  Non-Reform'a
Non-reform  prototype
0~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~%  .
1 - Year  of  reform  or  rnon-
0  I  I  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~reform  as  indlcaled




t~  -10  1099  1  991  1  992  1  993  1  994
o  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Group  3




1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994Figure  8: Inflation by Reform  Group, 1989-1994
7
6
5  - '  7  _  XM  Group 1
,  --- Group  2
(na  4  - _  '  '  '  -X,  '--X-Group  3
3  |  ,  '  "  - ' Group  4
3
I,'
2  , 
0
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994Z  Q)  O  - O  _  9  w  4  ) 
r-  :  7  90  '  '  '  '  '  7.90  '  '  )  '  '  '  7~~~  ~  ~~~~~.90  S  O  _  19  1.909  1.909  1.910] 
C  .2< 
.2) 
r  >  7.920 .7.2/%
O  7.37.909  7.909  7.90i 
,103  1.1.9.9  1  .91.41  1.941  o C  7.91  7.94  7 91  7.941  s
1.92  1.92  1.912  1.92 
7.17.929  7.929  7  7  7.912  c 
CD2  .92X  0  2/_  a  7.923  ' 
7.93  Z793  7 .7933  . 7.93 
1.94  41.7944  1.94  1.794  ID9; Figure 10: Political  Freedom  and Degree of Economic  Liberalization
4.5
y  =  0.625e°2677x  Croatia  FYR  Macedonia  Poland  Slovenia




3  - *  Bulgaria
Romania  /  Lithuania




15e  Kazakh  Motdova  Armenia
. ~~~Uzbekistan  «ri *  * G~eorgia
1  Turkmenistan  *  Azerbaijan  Belarus  Ukraine
0.5  Tajiklistan
0 - I  I  I  I  I  I
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Index of Political  Freedom
Source:  Freedom Review,  Jan  1995,  Authors
Notes:  CLI- Cumulative  Index of Liberalization;
Index of Political  Freedom has been reversed for  easier comparison  with  the CLI;
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